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Antiquities are looted from archaeological sites across the world, seemingly more 
often in areas of armed conflict. Previously, the relationship between antiquities 
looting and armed conflict has been assessed with qualitative case studies and 
journalistic evidence due to a lack of data. This study considers the relationship 
between antiquities looting and armed conflict in Egypt from 1997 – 2014 with a 
newly collected time series dataset. A combination of Lag-augmented Vector 
Autoregression (LA-VAR) and Autoregressive Distributed Lag Models (ARDL) is 
used to look at both the overall relationship between these two phenomena and their 
temporal ordering. Ultimately, this thesis finds that: (1) antiquities looting and armed 
conflict have a positive statistically significant relationship, (2) there is stronger 
support for antiquities looting preceding armed conflict than for the reverse temporal 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Antiquities looting has become increasingly prominent in news headlines. 
Newspapers around the world show headlines reporting antiquities looting from 
Israel, Cambodia, China, Greece, Italy, Egypt, Peru, Syria, and the United States.1 
Though reports of antiquities looting are found in all regions, many seem to be 
especially concentrated in areas of armed conflict. Indeed, many headlines suggest 
that there is a relationship between antiquities looting and armed conflict. Headlines 
such as “Syria’s Historical Artifacts aren’t just being Destroyed by ISIS, They’re 
Being Looted” imply that parties involved in armed conflict are using antiquities as a 
source of funding” (Robins-Early, 2015). Although there is evidence that over 50% of 
archaeological sites globally have reported at least some degree of looting (Proulx, 
2013), evidence on the extent to which antiquities looting is related to armed conflict 
is largely journalistic (see Antiquities Coalition, 2014). 
Such evidence is important; however, if antiquities looting is indeed 
concentrated in areas of armed conflict, then it is also important to quantitatively 
assess what, if any, relationship exists between them. There are two (non-mutually) 
exclusive relationships that are especially important to consider: strategic antiquities 
looting in armed conflict and opportunistic antiquities looting in armed conflict. 
These relationships reflect two temporal orderings: antiquities looting preceding 
armed conflict (strategic) and armed conflict preceding antiquities looting 
                                                 
1 Examples include “Peru Investigating Instances of Looting and Other Activities Threatening Nazca 
Lines,” “25 Greco-Roman artifacts seized in illicit digging attempt in Alexandria,” (Fox News Latino, 





(opportunistic). Because of the intrinsic value of antiquities, defined broadly in this 
research as any object over 100 years old located in the ground or embedded in a 
fixture of an archaeological site, they could be used to fund violent campaigns or to 
send messages that attack cultural identity.2 Both cases represent strategic antiquities 
looting. By contrast, during armed conflict there can be a breakdown in social order, 
which can lead to increases in crime in general including antiquities looting. 
Antiquities looting in this case is opportunistic and akin to other types of crime 
resulting from a vacuum in social order. 
Antiquities looting is a crime in many countries, yet criminology rarely adopts 
it as a crime of focus. Several scholars have called on criminologists to study art and 
antiquities related crimes, citing the need to apply concepts from deterrence to reduce 
the trafficking of looted antiquities (Casey, 2006; Dobovšek & Slak 2011; Hill, 2008; 
Mackenzie & Green, 2009; Ojedokun, 2012; Passas & Proulx, 2011; Polk, 2009). 
Other criminological theories, particularly those looking at the interaction between 
offenders and the settings of crimes (e.g., Routine Activity Theory and the CRAVED 
principles), are also applicable to this problem but have yet to be applied. Cohen and 
Felson’s (1979) Routine Activity Theory focuses on the elements necessary for a 
crime to occur (motivated offender, capable guardian, and suitable target). Clarke’s 
(1999) CRAVED principles focus on why certain resources or objects are used to 
fund armed conflict or terrorism.  
                                                 
2 There is no consensus on the definition of an antiquity of antiquities looting. A broader discussion of 





Despite the relevance of antiquities looting to criminology, most research on 
this topic has been conducted by archaeologists, art historians, and political scientists 
who emphasize the importance of maintaining the history and the cultural heritage of 
a given area. Yet, because antiquities looting is a crime in many countries and the 
trafficking of antiquities is a crime internationally, criminology has much to offer. 
There are also several scholars whose work focuses on how antiquities looting (and 
art theft) funds terrorism using qualitative and journalistic evidence (Di Giovanni et 
al., 2014; Hanson, 2015; Howard et al., 2015; Losson, 2016). For example, a news 
article by Di Giovanni et al. (2014) discusses antiquities looting as a source of 
funding for ISIS based on journalistic evidence that “by some estimates, these sales 
now represent ISIS’s second largest source of funding,” and that “hundreds of 
millions of dollars’ worth of irreplaceable pieces are being sold to fund terrorists.” 
Articles like Di Giovanni et al.’s are important for understanding the rich context 
around and underlying mechanisms of a specific incident. Quantitative analysis can 
complement journalistic and qualitative research by looking at patterns across 
incidents and time. 
This thesis uses criminological theory to illuminate the possibly complex 
relationship between antiquities looting and armed conflict quantitatively. For 
example, antiquities can be looted to support armed conflict and conflict can in turn 
promote looting by: (a) increasing the opportunities for crime due to decreased 
capable guardianship or (b) fostering antiquities looting to prolong or extend conflict 
(e.g., through targeted destruction of the opposing side’s “social identity,” providing 





support armed conflict and instead looting may begin as an opportunity-based crime. 
Then, during armed conflict antiquities looting can become a source of funding to 
prolong or extend the conflict, depending on the degree of organization among the 
involved parties.  
Understanding the nature of the relationship between looting and conflict 
might provide insight to design policy to prevent both armed conflict and antiquities 
looting more effectively. For example, if antiquities are looted to support armed 
conflict, then interventions could address the intentionality behind the crime. They 
could take into account the international nature of organized crime and how natural 
resources are targeted in conflicts (their monetary value, proximity, ease of 
concealment, and ease of transport). Further, an increase in antiquities looting might 
be one indicator that an armed conflict is brewing, giving the authorities time to 
intervene before the situation escalates. Conversely, if antiquities are looted as a 
result of increased opportunity in an armed conflict, then interventions could assess 
the nature of looting opportunities, including the effects of changes in capable 
guardianship and motivations of offenders (e.g., lack of ability to protect 
archaeological sites and incentivized looting through the issuance of licenses). 
This thesis assesses the relationship between antiquities looting and armed 
conflict in Egypt to better address this void. Egypt has several characteristics that 
make it a good case study for this research endeavor. Egypt has many antiquities and 
archaeological sites and it is invested in protecting its cultural heritage, increasing the 





many types of armed conflict, the analysis may be able to address whether different 
types of armed conflicts have different relationships with antiquities looting.  
The next chapter provides the theoretical background for the relationship 
between antiquities looting and armed conflict, focusing on strategic antiquities 
looting in armed conflict and opportunistic antiquities looting in armed conflict. The 
third chapter provides more context for Egypt as a case study. The fourth chapter 
outlines the data sources and method. The fifth chapter reviews the findings; the 







Chapter 2: Strategic and Opportunistic Looting in Armed 
Conflict 
Both the CRAVED principles and Routine Activity Theory can help explain 
the relationship between antiquities looting and armed conflict. Both theoretical 
perspectives draw on the rationality of the actor in weighing the risks and benefits 
prior to committing crime, which in the context of armed conflict may speak to the 
threshold at which looting becomes more favorable than the perceived (or actual) 
punishment. Researchers have argued that those looking to fund conflict will use 
objects that are easily accessible, transportable, and have a consistent market value, 
such as natural resources. Additionally, there needs to be a temporal and spatial 
confluence of three elements in order for a crime (e.g., antiquities looting) to occur: a 
suitable target, a motivated offender, and a lack of capable guardianship. Combined, 
these theories focus on why certain objects or places are subject to crime more often 
than others. 
Routine Activity Theory 
Cohen and Felson’s (1979) routine activity’s theory directly addresses the 
ecological requirement for crime, which encompasses both crimes committing during 
conflicts and archaeological sites. Cohen and Felson (1979) argue that there are three 
elements required for a crime to occur: a motivated offender, lack of capable 
guardianship, and suitable targets. When there is a confluence of these in time and 
space, crime is more likely to occur. They use the term target instead of victim as 
both persons and property can be considered “targets,” while a victim is usually a 





to how routine activities shape the potential for crime. First, potential offenders weigh 
the value of an intended target and the extent to which it has guardianship. Second, 
routine activities can create opportunities for crime through interactions between the 
offender and the intended target. 
Target suitability is central to both propositions. Cohen and Felson (1979) 
define target suitability as reflecting such things as value, inertia, visibility, and 
access (VIVA). Value refers to the material or symbolic desirability of a personal or 
property target. Inertia is how difficult it is to remove the target, including the 
“weight, size, and attached or locked features of property preventing or inhibiting its 
illegal removal and the physical capacity of personal victims to resist attackers” 
(Cohen & Felson, p. 591). Visibility is how exposed targets are to offenders (Felson 
& Clarke, 1998). Access refers to other features of everyday life that make it easy for 
offenders to get to targets (Felson & Clarke, 1998). 
Felson and Clarke (1998) further developed all four dimensions of target 
suitability, which they called the “VIVA model” as part of a broader discussion on 
the merits of viewing crime as a product of the interaction between the individual and 
the setting (p. 33). They argue that focusing on the setting frees criminologists from 
being confined to explaining crime based on abstractions or debates on class, race, or 
intelligence quotients (Felson & Clarke, 1998: 33). Instead, criminologists can focus 
on how tangible features of the world govern people’s movements, provide routines 
for people, and structure their choices. The VIVA model is one of ten principles of 
opportunity and crime used to support this argument, namely that “some products 





that the VIVA model offers a way to identify which products are likely to be targeted 
(“hot products”) using findings from studies by the Home Office Police Research 
Group (see for example, Brown, 1995). It is important to note that there have been no 
explicit tests of the VIVA model as a stand alone explanation of crime; it is always 
embedded in tests of opportunity theories (usually routine activities). 
Routine Activity Theory has been the focus of numerous tests, most of which 
focus on the notion of guardianship (Pratt & Cullen, 2005). Even without considering 
a motivated offender and the suitability of the target, studies generally support the 
conclusion that routine activities influence crime rates across ecological units. There 
is also a growing body of literature looking at how routine activities affect the 
likelihood of victimization (Fisher et al., 2010). While there tends to be support for 
the routine activities angle, inconsistent results and incomplete research designs limit 
the findings in this area (Meier & Miethe, 1993).  
Routine activities can help to explain how archaeological sites are targeted. 
These sites often cover large geographic areas, when there are typically few resources 
available for monitoring. Given their size, archaeological sites are both difficult to 
police and are typically areas of low priority. Thus, it is difficult to establish 
guardianship over archaeological sites. There is also a plethora of potentially valuable 
objects in an archaeological site, particularly in a country like Egypt, where 
antiquities are everywhere. According to Mohamed Ibrahim Ali, Egypt’s minister of 
state for antiquities, “when you dig, you find something” (Boyle, 2014). This makes 
archaeological sites eminently suitable targets for theft and looting. Finally, a 





& Felson, 1979). Looting of archaeological sites provides a living for many people; 
sometimes the trade is passed down through generations. This creates a pool of 
offenders who are especially able and willing to loot. Beyond the subsistence looters, 
the combination of a large number of archaeological sites and objects available with 
little to no guardianship could create a motivated offender from any person in need of 
some quick cash. 
CRAVED Principles 
Clarke’s (1999) CRAVED principles focus on the idea that certain objects (or 
natural resources) can be considered “hot products,” (a term he first uses in his paper 
with Felson in 1998 in discussing the VIVA model). He argues that just as focusing 
research on “hot spots” (places with high rates of reported crimes or police calls for 
assistance) has been effective for directing police and interventions to reduce crime, 
research should also focus on “hot products” to reduce crime (Clarke, 1999: v). He 
defines “hot products” as any kind of stolen good that is easily concealable, 
removable, available, valuable, enjoyable, and disposable (i.e. the CRAVED 
principles) (Clarke, 1999: vii). Such products include “not just manufactured goods, 
but also food, animals and works of art” (Clarke, 1999: v).  
The CRAVED principles are an extension of Cohen and Felson’s (1979) and 
Felson and Clarke’s (1998) discussion of target suitability and the VIVA model. 
Clarke (1999) agrees with both of these works that understanding the interaction of 
the setting and the target is essential for crime prevention, with an emphasis on 
understanding target suitability. The CRAVED principles also reflect the argument 





discussions of target suitability on features that structure offender choices. Both the 
VIVA model and the CRAVED principles identify features of objects (and for the 
VIVA model, persons) that make them more likely to be targeted by offenders for 
theft.  
Clarke’s principles move beyond VIVA by both refining its dimensions and 
extending them to address the limitation that the VIVA model cannot account for why 
certain objects are “hot” (Felson & Clarke, 1998: 33). Clarke breaks up value into 
valuable and enjoyable to account for both the monetary value and the fact that value 
can be subjective in the eye of the offender. An object might be “valuable” for 
aesthetic reasons even if there is no plan to sell it. Inertia and visibility are combined 
into the single concept of removable, and access is comparable with available. These 
concepts (valuable, enjoyable, removable, and available) get at what objects are likely 
to be taken. However, Clarke also includes why certain objects would be taken over 
others through the concepts of concealability and ease of disposal of goods. Both are 
judgements that must be made by the offender and speak to offender motivation 
because of Clarke’s emphasis on objects destined for illegal markets. Offenders will 
be more motivated to target objects that are judged to be easily concealable and easily 
disposed of because they will be easier to move and to sell for profit.  
These principles have been applied to the illegal wildlife market to better 
understand why some species are more likely to be trafficked than others (Moreto & 
Lemieux, 2014; Petrossian & Clarke, 2013; Pires & Clarke, 2012). These few studies 
have found support for the principles in that they were able to explain the focus on 





removable, available, valuable, enjoyable, and disposable). Further, they conclude 
that these principles are relevant for designing policies to combat illegal wildlife 
markets as well as other illegal markets. Both wildlife and antiquities that are 
trafficked to be sold in large part for their aesthetics. There is reason to suspect that 
these principles would also apply to antiquities. 
Antiquities are easily concealable by passing them off as fake, falsifying 
documents, creating pastiches out of multiple objects, or simply putting them in a 
pocket, depending on the size and type of object. They also have very little protection 
in archaeological sites and are thus easily removable, especially if the site is 
undocumented. In Egypt antiquities are readily available at numerous known and 
unknown archaeological sites. Antiquities have an inherent cultural and aesthetic 
value in addition to their high potential market value, which makes them ideal as a 
form of currency in exchange for supplies. Their aesthetic value also makes 
antiquities in high demand by collectors and museums. An antiquity that is used as a 
form of currency may be sold again or held onto for the enjoyment of its aesthetic 
value. Antiquities looted from archaeological sites, especially those that are 
undocumented, are easy to sell on the licit and illicit markets. Even with Red Lists3 
on certain types of antiquities, the market value of an antiquity remains high for a 
long period of time, so if it is not disposable immediately, it will be in the future. 
                                                 
3 The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) produces “Red 
Lists” or lists of classes of artifacts from specific countries that have been illegally looted and 
trafficked. These lists are intended as a guide for border patrol, law enforcement, dealers, collectors, 





Antiquities Looting and Armed Conflict: Two Relationships 
Both the CRAVED principles and routine activities can explain how antiquities 
looting can support armed conflict and be a consequence of armed conflict. 
Antiquities are objects that can be looted, transported, and disposed of into other 
illicit networks or sold at a high market value with little concern for getting caught. 
The lack of effective regulation over antiquities looting and trafficking makes them 
easily disposable (a key element for Clarke in the creation of “hot products”) and also 
makes them effective sources of revenue for funding conflict before and during the 
fighting. What distinguishes strategic antiquities looting in armed conflict and 
opportunistic antiquities looting in armed conflict are the characteristics that are more 
highly valued in each relationship.  The elements of Routine Activity Theory apply to 
both relationships and though all CRAVED principles apply to each relationship, they 
are not all equally important for each relationship. Table 1 provides an overview of 
how routine activities and the CRAVED principles support each relationship. The 
CRAVED principles that are more important for each relationship are italicized. 






Table 1. The application of the CRAVED principles and Routine Activity Theory to strategic and opportunistic looting. 
Opportunistic Antiquities Looting in Armed Conflict (i.e. Armed Conflict Preceding Antiquities Looting) 
CRAVED 
Principles 
Concealable Antiquities are easily concealed; however, during a breakdown in social order this may not be necessary. 
Removable 
Antiquities easily removed from archaeological sites due to lack of guardianship and general turmoil of 
conflict. 
Available 
Antiquities are readily available in all territory controlled by a group or easily accessible to an 
individual. 
Valuable 
Antiquities have a good return on investment and are able to be sold either in bulk for a quick return or 
individually to drive up the price. 
Enjoyable  The readily available supply of sellable antiquities and their ease of acquisition may provide enjoyment. 
Disposable 
There is always a market for antiquities. Even with agreements between countries if cultural heritage is in 




Suitable Targets There is a plethora of antiquities and archaeological sites available in countries like Egypt. 
Lack of Capable 
Guardianship 
Nationally, the breakdown in authority associated with many conflicts that further decreases capable 
guardianship. Internationally, existing regulations are ineffective and easy to bypass. 
Motivated Offender 
At the individual level, the choice of antiquities may be opportunistic as options to earn a living may be 
decreased. At the group level, the convenience makes it a natural resource of to exploit. 
Strategic Antiquities Looting in Armed Conflict (i.e. Antiquities Looting Preceding Armed Conflict) 
CRAVED 
Principles 
Concealable Antiquities are easily concealed and thus easier to get to the market before looting is noticed. 
Removable Antiquities are easily removed from archaeological sites due to stretched resources. 
Available 
Antiquities are readily available in territory controlled by a group but objects may also be targeted if they 
are not in territory controlled by group and thus not readily available. 
Valuable 
Antiquities have a good return on investment and can be sold either to the market or used as 
currency/collateral in trade for weapons and other materials. 
Enjoyable Looting a culture’s heritage that does not align ideologically with the group’s may provide enjoyment. 
Disposable 
There is always a market for antiquities, especially if there are no agreements between governments 




Suitable Targets There is a plethora of antiquities and archaeological sites available in countries like Egypt. 
Lack of Capable 
Guardianship 
Nationally, local resources are not sufficient to protect all archaeological sites. Internationally, existing 
regulations are ineffective and easy to bypass. 





Strategic Antiquities Looting in Armed Conflict 
An increase in looting prior to a conflict or during a conflict might reflect that 
one or more parties (ethnic group, terrorist organization, etc.) may be selling or 
trafficking antiquities to acquire funds to support or sustain a conflict or violent 
action.4 As mentioned above, it is difficult to maintain guardianship over 
archaeological sites during times of peace and archaeological sites are eminently 
suitable targets for crime by motivated offenders. In armed conflict, capable 
guardianship is difficult to maintain as the priorities of government shift to address 
the greatest need. Nationally, archaeological sites are more likely to be overlooked 
during conflict as local law enforcement are deployed elsewhere. Internationally, 
existing regulations are both easy to bypass and ineffective at stopping trafficking in 
looted objects during conflict.  
With regard to motivated offenders, actors in armed conflicts and trafficking 
networks intentionally and rationally choose how to finance their actions, using 
whatever resources are accessible “unless these clash with honestly held religious or 
ideological positions” (Passas & Jones, 2006: 1). They prefer easily acquired objects 
because these do not require any special skills and are a reliable source of revenue 
(Freeman, 2011). The choice of archaeological sites and antiquities is strategic and 
intended to fund current and future activities.  
                                                 
4 While it is more likely that an increase in antiquities looting would signal a rise in local conflict, it is 
possible that an international organization could loot antiquities in one country to fund a conflict or 
violent action in another. Documents from ISIL’s “department of artifacts” confirm antiquities looting 
as a source of income for the organization. Given that they control territory in Syria and Iraq, they 





The strategic value of antiquities for conflict financing relates to their 
suitability as a target for looting in armed conflict. Antiquities can be seen as a natural 
resource that is exploited, or a “hot product” (Clarke, 1999). Although Clarke (1999) 
does not specifically consider “hot products” in the context of conflicts, objects that 
meet the CRAVED principles would be good resources to exploit for financial needs 
as conflict is just a specific need.5 Specifically, objects that are concealable, 
removable, valuable, and disposable should be the most relevant of the CRAVED 
principles for financing an armed conflict.6 Antiquities are easily concealed, making 
it easier to get them on the market before the looting is noticed. Looting 
archaeological sites (i.e. digging holes) does not require any special skills, which 
makes antiquities easily accessible (Freeman, 2011). The high concentration of 
valuable objects within archaeological sites makes them a reliable means of acquiring 
funds. Most important though, are their value as a commodity and their disposability. 
From an organizational perspective, access to large quantities of easily accessible 
natural resources is a good source of funding. Plentiful resources with little market 
value or a small return on investment are not a good source of funding for conflict 
because they must be sold quickly. In times of conflict, quick trades or sales are not 
always possible, so commodities that retain their market value are better sources of 
funding. Commodities, like diamonds and antiquities that maintain their market value 
and have a high return on investment are favored because they can be sold or held as 
needed. There are thousands of categories of both diamonds and antiquities, the most 
                                                 
5 The role of natural resources in armed conflicts has been examined in more depth in political 
economics. See for example, the work of Michael Ross (2004) and Philippe LeBillon (2001). 





valuable of which will have a narrow market. Once they enter the market, they will be 
noticed; however, their sale will have a high return. Lower-end diamonds and 
antiquities can also be sold in bulk at consistent prices. Both can also be used as 
currency for illegal goods and services (Wilford, 2003) and they are excellent 
“storage assets” because they retain their market value over time (Hardouin & 
Weichhardt, 2006: 306). 
Opportunistic Antiquities Looting in Armed Conflict 
Armed conflict may also increase the extent of antiquities looting by changing 
the opportunity and choice structuring properties around this type of crime. Conflict 
makes looting easier by exacerbating the difficulty in monitoring and protecting 
archaeological sites, which in turn makes it easier for objects to reach the legal 
markets. During times of armed conflict, there is often a breakdown in authority that 
further decreases capable guardianship, both affecting the motivation of the offenders 
and the suitability of the target. Where prior to conflict the perceived (or actual) cost 
of committing a crime like looting may have been too high, the decrease in capable 
guardianship may lower the perceived risk. Given the potential existing lack of 
guardianship, it may also be the case that at an individual level, previously available 
more profitable options (legal or illegal) become unavailable or too difficult to pursue 
during armed conflict. In such a case, looting would be considered an opportunistic 
crime with easier access, high rewards, and little to no consequences.  
Archaeological sites become suitable (and possibly ideal) targets during 
armed conflict not only for the ease of access and low perceived cost, but also for the 





archaeological site, making them easily removable. The prevalence of antiquities 
makes them readily available to loot while the action of looting is difficult to detect. It 
is easy to fake an object’s provenance (history of ownership), which allows them to 
move through a gray market (a market that conducts both legal and illegal 
transactions) to the buyers in legal markets (Kersel, 2006; Mackenzie, 2011; Proulx, 
2013).  
Given the inter-related nature of armed conflict and antiquities looting, I 
expect that both of the above relationships exist. This research examines the extent to 
which antiquities looting leads to armed conflict and armed conflict leads to 
antiquities looting. It is important to note that the argument antiquities looting to 
support armed conflict is most applicable to domestic conflicts, particularly in the 
case of Egypt where there is a long history of religious and ethnic conflict. Because 
Egypt has antiquities from many cultural groups, it is possible to target a specific 
culture’s heritage. Any strategic decision to use antiquities as a funding source could 
also involve targeting a particular culture or history that does not reflect the group’s 
ideology.  As such, part of this research also involves looking at conflict events by the 
type of conflict. The methods and data that I used to test my hypotheses about these 
relationships are discussed in the following sections. 
Hypotheses 
1. Antiquities looting and armed conflict have a positive statistically significant 
relationship 
2. An increase in antiquities looting incidents will precede an increase in armed 
conflict incidents 






Chapter 3: Egypt as a Case Study 
There are a number of countries in the Middle East with a rich cultural 
heritage that could serve as the case study for this research; however, there are three 
primary reasons for why Egypt is a good case study. First, Egypt has a long, rich, 
cultural heritage and is invested in attempting to protect and preserve it. Second, 
because Egypt is invested in its cultural heritage, it is more likely to report when 
antiquities are looted, which is essential for data collection. Third, Egypt’s armed 
conflict events from 1997 – 2014 have relatively well-defined start dates, which are 
helpful when trying to disentangle the two possible relationships between antiquities 
looting and armed conflict. This date range covers the end of one armed conflict in 
Egypt that spanned 1993 – 1998 and the beginning of a second conflict in Egypt 
spanning 2011 – present day.7 Each reason is discussed in more detail below. 
Egypt’s Cultural Heritage 
Cultural heritage is everywhere in Egypt and integral to its economic 
wellbeing. Egypt has a history of preserving its cultural heritage and because almost 
all the cities are built in the presence of heritage sites, they use the preservation of 
these sites to their advantage by marketing their history to tourists (Coben, 2011; 
UNDP, 2016). As tourism makes up a large part of Egypt’s economy, it is in the 
country’s interest to both preserve the quality and quantity of its cultural heritage. To 
maintain the quality of the sites, the country periodically shuts down the pyramids to 
                                                 
7 Egypt was part of conflicts dating back to the 1980s; however, they do not have cleanly defined start 
and end dates and there is less information on the motivations behind the conflicts. As such, this thesis 
focuses on only two conflicts. Additionally, the date range ends in 2014 as data from 2015 will not 





mitigate environmental changes resulting from the press of tourists. For example, the 
humidity caused by people breathing in a burial chamber can lead to changes in the 
pH balance of the imagery (Golia, 2014). Egypt has also invested in their cultural 
heritage by getting them on the UNESCO World Heritage list. Egypt is home to 
seven UNESCO World Heritage Sites and has another 33 proposed heritage sites 
under consideration (UNESCO, 2016).  
Despite Egypt’s best efforts, the sheer quantity of cultural heritage in the 
country makes preservation a difficult task. Cultural heritage includes all objects in 
museums and storage facilities, the great monuments, antiquities in archaeological 
sites (both known and unknown). There are numerous archaeological sites in Egypt, 
many of which are tourist destinations. However, there is no complete list of 
archaeological sites that have been or are in the process of being excavated in Egypt 
and there are also numerous sites that have not yet been identified or discovered. As 
such, there are many unknown archaeological sites in Egypt. This quantity of 
antiquities means there are a lot of antiquities to steal from known or unknown 
archaeological sites.  
Egypt is invested in protecting its cultural heritage and has a long history of 
attempting to protect and preserve its cultural heritage from the destruction of conflict 
and from looters. Their strategy for reducing the looting of antiquities, especially 
from archaeological sites, is to pass stricter laws with harsher penalties, increase 
security measures, and place checkpoints at every Egyptian port (El-Aref, 2005). 
Unfortunately, there has been no systematic evaluation of these measures, so it is 





A Brief History of Armed Conflict in Egypt 
This section provides a brief history of armed conflict in Egypt to provide 
context for the analysis discussed in the next section. Egypt has long history of 
multiculturalism and armed conflict tied to tensions between religious groups and 
non-state actors, particularly between Coptic Christians and Muslim groups (UCDP, 
2015). This section focuses only on those events taking place between 1993 and 2014 
to provide the context for both conflicts that are partially covered in the time period 
of the study (1997 – 2014). From 1993 to 2014, Egypt experienced two major armed 
conflicts along with scattered incidents of terrorism and unrest, all of which related to 
changes in the Egyptian Government. Neither conflict is completely contained in the 
period of study, which may affect the results of the analysis (see below for more 
information on this). 
Starting in the 1990s, the Egyptian Government underwent a massive 
neoliberal reform, from a primarily state-operated economy to a globalized capitalist 
very quickly (Schwartz, 2011: 33). While the government was creating a capitalist 
foundation in the country, it was not advancing Western ideals of equal rights for 
citizens (Schwartz, 2011). Thus, while Egypt as a country was doing well 
economically, dissatisfaction with the government was growing from both the 
Islamist groups and the disenfranchised lower classes of society. Islamist groups’ 
took issue with the secular influence of the West on the government and instead 
wanting to create an Islamic state (Schwartz, 2011: 33-34).  The lower classes and 
disenfranchised (e.g., women and Coptic Christians) took issue with the lack of rights 





From 1993 – 1998, the Egyptian Government was engaged in an intrastate 
conflict with the al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Group) over governmental 
power. Originally a part of the Muslim Brotherhood, a political party and religious 
organization, the Islamic Group’s radical views led them to split off in the 1970s 
(Fletcher, 2008).8 The Islamic Group sought to overthrow the secular government and 
replace it with an Islamic regime by using violence to garner support for their 
position. Their insurgency targeted more than the government by attacking other 
religious groups like the Coptic Christians, secularists, and any others who opposed 
them. In the most notable incident, the Luxor Massacre (1997), six al-Gama militants 
attacked tourists visiting a temple, killing 63 of them. Several of the leaders were 
imprisoned and signed a unilateral truce; however, the conflict did not end until 1998, 
when Egyptian authorities arrested the remainder of the group (including those that 
rejected the truce) (Fletcher, 2008; UCDP, 2015). While this conflict ended in 1998, 
the actions of the al-Gama movement resonated with other Islamist groups like the 
Tahwid wal Jihad (United and Holy War) that conducted terrorist attacks in 2004-
2005 (Fletcher, 2008; UCDP, 2015). 
From 2011 – present day, Egypt has been involved in an intrastate armed 
conflict stemming from the Arab Spring uprising in Egypt of 2011. The Arab Spring 
began in other countries in 2010, but did not impact Egypt until 2011, when President 
Hosni Mubarak was ousted as a result of large scale uprisings (involving both the 
Islamic Group and Coptic Christians) that demanded his resignation (Masoud, 2011). 
                                                 
8 The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in the 1920s by Hassan al-Banna, who believed that 
secularization and modernization were taking Muslim countries away from the glory of the ancient 





The initial impetus of the uprising involved many, sometimes contradictory, goals. 
While both Coptic Christians and Islamist groups called for Mubarak’s resignation, 
Coptic Christians wanted more equality and higher wages (especially for women). 
Meanwhile, the Islamist Group disdained the secular government and wanted a return 
to an Islamic rule (Bowker, 2013; Gerbaudo, 2011; Masoud, 2011; Schwartz; 2011; 
UCDP, 2015). Additionally, the role of the military has been central to this intrastate 
conflict as it has consistently had the most power and influence beyond that of the 
government (Gerbaudo, 2013). They have at times supported the uprisings and at 
other times suppressed them. The Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) 
assumed leadership of the government after Mubarak resigned until Mohammed 
Morsi was elected President in 2012. Morsi was then ousted in a military coup in 
2013 due to his inability to find a credible alternative to an Islamic state and 
perceived ineptitude (Gerbaudo, 2013: 104-105). The former military chief Abdel 
Fattah el-Sisi has now held the position of President since 2014 (Basil, 2014). 
Reports of Antiquities Looting in Egypt 
 Egypt’s investment in its cultural heritage makes it more likely to report 
instances of looting, theft, or destruction. It has a long history of reporting to market 
countries like the United States and international bodies like the International Center 
for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM) 
when its cultural heritage is in danger. Such reports lead to the development of 
memorandums of understanding prohibiting the import, export and sale of antiquities 
from Egypt and the issuance of Red Lists of prohibited or stolen antiquities, 





– 2014, there were 150 news reports in English language outlets that mentioned 
looting, theft, destruction, return or repatriation of antiquities in Egypt. This is likely 
an underestimate of the number of reports that went to news agencies since is only 
includes English news sources. There are also several Egyptian archaeologists who 
have tried to report individual instances of archaeological looting as they find them.9 
Although this may seem like a small number of reports for a 17-year period, it is still 
more news reports than other countries apart from Iraq and Syria. These reports also 
reflect the degree to which the country is invested in its cultural heritage. The number 
of news reports in the Arab Spring were more than four times that of all the other 
years combined, which suggests that media reports will only continue to become 
more prevalent as time passes. This investment and commitment to reporting events 
makes it more likely that there is data in news reports that can be quantified. 
Combined with Egypt’s plethora of antiquities and it’s clearly defined armed 
conflicts, this tendency to report events makes Egypt a good choice for a case study 
looking at the relationship between armed conflict and antiquities looting. 
                                                 






Chapter 4: Data & Methods 
I created both a month-level and a quarter-level dataset with variables for 
reports of antiquities looting incidents at archaeological sites and reports of all armed 
conflict incidents in Egypt from 1997 – 2014. A month was the smallest unit of time 
that still had sufficient variation in the number of antiquities looting events reported 
and the number of armed conflict incidents reported. Because antiquities looting is 
such a rare event in the media, I also conducted an analysis at the quarter level to see 
whether the unit of analysis affected the outcome. The next three sections discuss the 
utility of open source data, definitions for antiquities looting and armed conflict, and 
data sources. 
The Utility of Open Source Data & Quantitative Methods 
Open source data broadly include any publicly available information that can 
be coded and quantified into a data base. These data have several benefits for 
studying crime, especially those types that are not traditionally considered “street 
crime.” First, by virtue of being publicly available, open source data are useful for 
studying new areas within criminology. There is generally less data available on 
crimes not considered “street crimes” because they are not areas of focus (and thus 
funding) within the discipline of criminology. Official sources of data, such as the 
Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) in the United States, have developed to include 
information on crimes relevant to law enforcement. Crimes that are not a priority for 
law enforcement will not be included in these data sources. Self-report data have 





access to responses from offenders themselves. For those crimes that are considered 
outside of the traditional scope of criminology, official and self-report data either do 
not exist or are not available to the public. Open source data allow researchers to look 
at new types of crime that would otherwise not be considered. 
Second, open source data are a cost-effective way to collect data on a wide 
variety of subjects. Online digitization, publishing, and archiving of newspapers, 
journals, and blogs provides easy access to decades of news articles from media 
outlets around the globe. Repositories can be specific to a single institution (e.g., 
Reuter’s10 archives) or be large databases covering many large and small publications 
(e.g., Lexis Nexis11). Access to these databases through universities or private 
subscriptions allows researchers to access large quantities of information spanning 
any subject. These databases also allow for easier data collection on international 
crimes. Within criminology, open source data has been used to create one of the most 
robust terrorism databases currently in use – the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) 
(LaFree & Dugan, 2007). 
With respect to antiquities looting, open source news stories provide an initial 
look at the scope of both antiquities looting incidents and interest in these events. 
Egypt, despite its long history of attempting to stop the looting and trafficking of 
antiquities, has been unable to evaluate the effectiveness of their actions as they do 
not have any baseline numbers to work from. As the data show, the number of news 
                                                 
10 Reuters is the news and media division within Thomson Reuters, one of the world’s largest 
international news providers across multiple forms of media. See 
http://thomsonreuters.com/en/products-services/reuters-news-agency.html. 
11 Lexis Nexis is a news article database with archives from 1987 – 2014 accessible through the 





stories reporting antiquities looting in Egypt has increased since 2011 (see Figure 2). 
Though an imperfect measure, such data can start to provide a baseline on the 
frequency of looting events. Open source data also allows for empirical analysis and a 
more nuanced understanding of the relationship between antiquities looting and 
armed conflict.  
 
Figure 1. Reports of Antiquities Looting 1997-2014 
Quantitative methods are also important for understanding this issue and, as 
this analysis shows, have much to offer. Prior evidence of any relationship between 
antiquities looting and armed conflict has been journalistic or based on case studies of 
isolated incidents. Quantitative methods like multiple time series complement these 
qualitative methods in two ways. First, they make it possible to look at whether there 
is any empirical evidence for a relationship between the two. Second, they make it 
possible to see if the relationship is true over time and for different types of conflicts. 
The analysis above found empirical evidence of the relationship within the context of 
one conflict and across a broader time-period including periods of conflict and peace. 
While the results should be viewed cautiously given the exploratory nature of this 
study, their consistency across time periods and units of analysis indicate the value of 














































































































































































































There is no consensus among international legislation or academics on the 
definition of an antiquity (e.g., compare the definitions in the 1954 Hague Convention 
and the 1970 or 1972 UNESCO Conventions). The debate focuses on what 
specifically distinguishes the terms for an antiquity, cultural property, and cultural 
heritage. All three terms are generally defined to include any object, building, work of 
art, scientific collection, archive, manuscript, or structure with cultural, 
archaeological, historical, prehistorical, literary, linguistic, artistic or scientific value 
that is over 100 years old. Broadly, definitions for these terms include: moveable 
objects (objects removed from archaeological sites, museums, archives), immovable 
objects (monuments, historic buildings), and intangible culture (songs, traditions, and 
folklore). As the focus of this research is on archaeological sites, I define an antiquity 
as any object over 100 years old located in the ground or structural complex within an 
archaeological site. Antiquities looting is defined as illegally excavating antiquities. 
According to journalistic evidence (existing media portrayals, qualitative case 
studies) and satellite imagery, antiquities looting is not a rare event (Manacorda & 
Chappell, 2011; Parcak, 2009); however, it is less likely to be reported in official 
reports or the news than other types of events (e.g., terrorist attacks). What accounts 
for this “dark figure of looting”? One explanation could be that there is a lack of 
access to sites where looting occurs during conflict or lack of resources on the part of 
law enforcement. Changes in trends in reporting and the social media revolution also 
impact the underrepresentation of antiquities looting in the news. News and media 





social media platforms and the ease with which information can be shared have 
contributed to a general increase in news reports and social media reports (Facebook, 
Twitter, etc.) as well as an increase during times of armed conflict. 
This surge in media coverage of armed conflicts occurred prior to the social 
media revolution as well; however, it was not as large a scale and news was not 
always as widely disseminated. The result of these changes is that during armed 
conflict it there are more likely to be reports of antiquities looting (and other crimes 
in the area) but post-social media revolution there are more likely to be reports on 
antiquities looting period. What is unknown is whether the increase seen in the 
number of reports of antiquities looting reflects an actual increase or just an increase 
in coverage of such incidents. All of these contribute to the “dark figure of looting,” 
and as a result, any incidents that are reported in the news are likely to be an 
underestimate of the true extent of looting. 
To capture as many incidents of antiquities looting as possible, data were 
compiled from multiple sources. Reuters was a good source to start with because its 
editorial control over the content is better than any other source (Dugan & 
Chenoweth, 2013: 472; Schrodt & Gerner, 1994). However, given that reports of 
antiquities looting are relatively rare in the news, I also used Lexis Nexis, which pulls 
from many different news sources. The goal initially was to code each story based on 
the lead sentence12 alone; however, there was not sufficient detail in the lead 
sentences to do so. As such, the lead sentences served as a means of filtering out non-
                                                 





relevant cases. Each remaining news story was then coded in its entirety for 
information on antiquities looting incidents.  
Data were compiled both from news stories previously downloaded (in 
batches of 100) from Reuters using Factiva13 and those downloaded for this research 
from Lexis Nexis. The data from both sources were available starting in the 1980s. To 
ensure that no stories were left out, data were pulled from Reuters and Lexis Nexis 
for as many years as were available (1980 – 2012 and 1987 – 2014, respectively). 
Only data from 1997 – 2014 were ultimately kept for the analysis (see below). The 
Reuters data included 180,349 stories downloaded using only the key term “Egypt” 
and the Lexis Nexis data included 1,138 stories downloaded using a complex search 
string. The data from Reuters had already been downloaded in batches of 100 and 
each batch had to be searched individually for key terms relating to antiquities 
looting. By contrast, the Lexis Nexis data were downloaded for this analysis and so a 
complex search string of key terms could be used, which accounts for the difference 
in the initial number of results returned. 
Table 2 shows the key words searched for both Reuters and Lexis Nexis and 
the number of results returned for each.14 While the time period of interest is 1997 – 
2014, all articles from 1987 – 2014 were initially kept and coded (see analytic plan 
below). All coding of the news stories was done by hand. All lead sentences were 
                                                 
13 Factiva is an online tool that provides access to thousands of news articles and other information 
services. The service allows searches based on specific criteria and formats the results as downloadable 
datasets. See http://new.dowjones.com/products/factiva/. 
14 After the initial search of key terms was conducted, I thought to add “illicit dig” and illegal” dig to 





reviewed to remove stories not relating to antiquities looting in Egypt or that were 
published prior to 1987. 
Table 2. Key Terms for Reuters and Lexis Nexis Data 
Reuters Lexis Nexis 
Key Words # of Results Complex Search String # of Results 
archaeological 28 Egypt AND  
archaeological OR 
archeological OR 
archaeological site OR 
archeological site OR historic 
site OR relic OR antiquities 
OR art OR antique OR 
cultural heritage OR cultural 
property OR artifact OR 
artefact  
AND  
theft OR looting OR danger 
OR smuggling OR smuggled 










archaeological site 9 






antiquities looting 0 
cultural heritage 9 
cultural property 0 
danger 305 
historic site 2 
smuggling 198 
smuggler 71 
smuggled 66 Note: "fake" and "forgery" 
were omitted from the Lexis 
Nexis search string as an 
independent search of the 
terms returned no relevant 
results. The terms "archeol*" 
and "archaeol*" were omitted 
because an independent 










Total 2567 Total 1138 
Note: The totals in this table include redundancies. For example, if a sentence included both “art” and 
“dealer,” that sentence would be captured twice - once for each search term. 
Those lead sentences that were unclear, were marked as “unsure” and kept for 





732 stories were coded based on the entire news story according to the following 
variables (see Appendix I for a complete codebook): 
 Id 
 Publication date 




 Day  
 Summary of the incident (brief 1-2 sentence description of the incident) 
 Location (a description of the incident location) 
 Location type (archaeological site, museum, other, or no information 
provided) 
 Location type text (only if location type was “other”) 
 Incident type (destruction, looting, or theft) 
 Was the object recovered 
 Date of recovery 
 Object(s) recovered 
 Related stories 
 Was the object repatriated 
 Object(s) repatriated 
 Date of repatriation 
For any case that was marked unsure, or when there was a question on the 
information provided in the news story, additional research would be conducted to 
corroborate and supplement the information in the story. This research involved 
tracing sources referenced in the story or by searching for additional news stories not 
captured by Reuters or Lexis Nexus that had more detailed information on the case in 
question.15 Supplemental sources were recorded in the “related stories” variable 
below.  
                                                 
15 To confirm that any supplemental news stories were truly not captured by the initial search, I did a 





Coding was done based on the content of the story rather than the presence of 
the story itself. Because of the inherently subjective nature of defining and 
quantifying “antiquities looting,” it is important to discuss the assumptions I made 
about what constitutes an incident of looting. For this research, I assumed that only 
one incident of looting occurred in a given day at a given location, unless the news 
article specifically identified multiple looters, times of day, or locations of antiquities 
looting.  
Often, looting in news articles is reported in generalized statements, such as 
“The looting is pandemic, every night and even in the morning," (Hiel, 2013) or 
“Illegal digs near ancient temples and in isolated desert sites have swelled a 
staggering 100-fold over the past 16 months…” (Hendawi, 2012). Such instances 
were both too specific and too vague. Across all stories, there was not enough 
consistent detail to determine whether the looting being described was a sustained 
activity, multiple separate attempts, multiple coordinated attempts, or an isolated brief 
incident. As such, the most consistent and granular amount of information I could 
code was one looting incident per day at a given archaeological site. The exception to 
this coding rule was if the article specifically identified multiple incidents of looting 
(multiple looters, locations, days, etc.). 
If a story referred to multiple incidents, each incident was coded separately. 
For example, one article referred to four separate instances of looting to code: two 
separate instances at the Bent pyramid of Giza, one incident at a pyramid complex 
south of Cairo, and incident at the site of Tell El Fara’in (Raven, 2011). Further, in 





many, mid-), the common meaning of the term was used. For example, if an incident 
took place “several weeks” ago, it would be coded as 3 weeks prior to the date of 
publication. After coding the data, there were 190 incidents, including instances of 
theft and destruction at locations other than archaeological sites.  
For an incident to be considered looting, the object(s) had to have been 
removed from the ground or structural complex of an archaeological site.16 Since the 
act of looting often destroys some, if not all, of a site, an incident was only coded as 
destruction if the main purpose was indicated as destruction and no objects were 
taken. Similarly, the terms “looting” and “theft” are often synonymous in the media. 
In this research, an incident could only be coded as theft if the object(s) have been 
recorded and removed from the archaeological site. For example, an object taken 
from an archaeological site storage facility is theft because the objects have already 
been discovered and recorded. Though seemingly a semantic distinction, strategic and 
opportunistic targeting of catalogued collections may differ from strategic and 
opportunistic targeting of unknown objects.  
Antiquities in museums have been catalogued, researched, and often been the 
subject of publication. This makes such objects more difficult to sell on the black 
market without a buyer already lined up. Thus, the strategy involved in targeting a 
museum may be for a single object that has been requested by a buyer elsewhere in 
the world. Museums also do not exclusively hold antiquities or objects from a single 
culture. They are repositories of many cultures and time periods from ancient times to 
                                                 
16 My definition of antiquities requires that the object be at least 100 years old. By restricting this 
research to archaeological sites, I inferred the age of the object from the location of the incident. This 
is a reasonable assumption to make since archaeological sites in Egypt contain objects and features of 





present day and though some news articles report specific objects that have been 
stolen, many more simply report that an object has been taken. It is not possible to 
determine whether such objects are antiquities or contemporary works. From an 
opportunistic perspective, museums are more likely to be targeted in riots/protests or 
civil unrest that occurs in the dense cities where such buildings are located. In such 
cases they are more likely to be the target of general crime and mayhem that happens 
to result in the loss of an antiquity.  
By contrast, looting of archaeological sites requires more intention for both 
opportunistic and strategic forms of looting. Strategically, archaeological sites are 
targeted because any antiquities discovered are the equivalent of unmarked bills. 
They have no record of existence and so are easier to sell on the market without 
predetermined buyers. Further, because armed conflicts are not bounded by city limits 
and archaeological sites are often in more rural locations (or at least outside the city 
limits), people do not necessarily have to go out of their way to target archaeological 
sites. Indeed, several news articles reported people digging in the bases of their 
homes for objects because they happened to find something one day. Opportunistic 
looting in the wake of armed conflict may result because of the general lack of order 
surrounding remote locations where skirmishes took place. Given these distinctions, 
destruction, theft, and looting are coded as separate actions in the data. 
There were also several cases that could not be classified as destruction, theft, 
or looting, and so were coded as “other.” For example, because a storage facility is 
not within the archaeological complex, it is not considered part of the archaeological 





archaeological site. For example, if a part of a statue is removed or part of a mural cut 
from a wall or tomb, this action would be considered looting even if the object(s) had 
been identified previously by archaeologists. Below are examples of incidents coded 
as “looted,” “theft,” and “destruction.” For more detailed discussion of the coding 
decisions made, see the codebook in Appendix I. 
Looting: “Grave-robbers cut away part of a false door bearing painted stone 
reliefs depicting ceremonial figures and a bronze statue of Horus was also 
taken” (Boseley, 1997). 
Destruction: “a bomb blast destroyed a museum/mosque with Islamic art in 
it” (Gauch, 2014). 
Theft: “Ka-Nefer-Nefer mask from 19th dynasty Egyptian noblewoman 
stolen in early 1990s from the storage facility near it's excavation site” (MO 
Lawyers Media Staff, 2006). 
When a site was described as being looted consistently for a long period of time, it 
was assumed that at least one looting would happen per day and so the incident was 
counted 1 per day unless details were provided identifying separate lootings. For 
example, one story specified that looting had occurred at the site of Abydos in Luxor 
each night since the beginning of the month. As the story was published on March 19, 
2011, I coded 18 instances of looting in that location. There were 20 cases where 
information was available for the year but not the month. These cases were coded as 
taking place in June, since it was the middle of the year.17 Cases where: (1) there was 
not enough information to code specific incidents, (2) only information on the year 
was available, (3) incidents were of theft or destruction, and (4) incidents located 
outside of archaeological sites were excluded from the final dataset. As the time 
                                                 
17 Comparing coding these cases at different months throughout the year (i.e. coding them as January 
vs. June) had no significant impact on the findings. As such, they were coded as if they occurred in 
June to be consistent with prior coding decisions regarding dates. I also found that there was no 
difference in the results, regardless of whether these cases were included or excluded from the dataset. 





period of interest is 1997-2014, cases prior to 1997 were ultimately dropped from the 
final dataset. There were 91 cases of antiquities looting at archaeological sites from 
1997 – 2014. The antiquities looting data were aggregated to both the month and 
quarter such that a given row contains the total number of looting incidents at 
archaeological sites for a given month or quarter, respectively. 
The main limitation with these data is the implicit bias in the data that is 
unavoidable. I am restricted by what the media chooses to cover on antiquities 
looting, which changes over time. This includes what the media considers to be 
newsworthy, what is of interest to the public, and the means of reporting information. 
For example, the advent of the Internet made it significantly easier for journalists and 
amateur reporters to disseminate information. This in turn broadened the range of 
newsworthy topics making it more likely to antiquities looting to be reported later in 
the timeline. Additionally, news stories may lack granularity to get at the actual 
behavior of interest – antiquities looting. More dramatic or serious cases of looting 
are more likely to be reported by news agencies while every day looting may go 
unnoticed or unreported. As such, the events in the data may disproportionately 
represent targeted or strategic lootings compared to opportunistic lootings. We also 
must assume that objects have been removed from the sites being reported as 
“looted.” With this data, the closest we can get is reports of antiquities looting. 
Armed Conflict 
Similar to antiquities looting, armed conflict is an ambiguous term; it can fall 
within the legal purview of international humanitarian law or it can fall outside of 





and include general international conventions such as the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 and more specific agreements like the 1954 Hague Convention (ICRC, 2004). 
International humanitarian laws only apply to those conflicts with definite start and 
end dates or by whether the involved parties are organized groups and if the incident 
meets a certain threshold for the number of fatalities. Battles in a civil war or 
bombings in an inter-state conflict would meet this definition. These laws do not 
cover “internal tensions or disturbances such as isolated acts of violence” (ICRC, 
2004). As such, riots, political violence, and terrorist attacks are all types of armed 
conflict that typically fall outside of humanitarian laws.  
In order to capture a wide range of political violence, I compiled data on 
armed conflicts from two sources of event data: the Armed Conflict Location and 
Event Data Project (ALCED) and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). For this 
research, I looked at three categories of armed conflict: terrorism, riots/protests, and 
other types of armed conflict in order to discern whether the relationship between 
antiquities looting and armed conflict differs by type of conflict. Terrorism accounts 
for approximately 78% of incidents in the GTD and riots/protests account for 
approximately 63% of the ACLED incidents. So, while this is somewhat of a 
simplification of the range of armed conflict in Egypt, this breakdown allows for an 
initial look at whether the type of conflict is relevant. 
Data from the ACLED compile information on a variety of political violence 
incidents in Egypt from 1997 – 2014. These data are currently coded by date, 
location, agent, and event type. Event type includes three types of battles, violence 





violent demonstrations), and three types of non-violent events (ACLED, 2015). There 
is also no fatality minimum, so the data capture all political violence episodes in a 
given state (ACLED, 2015). 
To ensure there are armed conflict events throughout the whole time period of 
interest capture terrorist attacks, which are not included in the ACLED, I used data 
from the GTD. The GTD is an open-source event level database that includes terrorist 
events from around the world from 1970 – 2014. It was designed to be a 
comprehensive, robust event database of domestic and international terrorist attacks 
(LaFree et al., 2015). Data include variables on: incident date, region, country, 
state/province, city, latitude and longitude, perpetrator group name (when known), 
tactic used in attack, nature of the target, identity/corporation/and nationality of the 
target, type of weapons used, whether incident was considered a success, if and how a 
claim of responsibility was made, amount of damage, total number of fatalities, total 
number of injured, and if incident was international or domestic (LaFree et al., 2015; 
START, 2015). To be included, an incident must be “an intentional act of violence or 
threat of violence by a non-state actor” (LaFree et al., 2015: 19). Additionally, 
incidents are only included if they meet at least two of the following three criteria: (1) 
the violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal; 
(2) the violent act included evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey 
some other message to a larger audience(s) other than the immediate victims; and (3) 
the violent act was outside the precepts of international Humanitarian Law (LaFree et 





The data from both databases were filtered to include variables on the incident 
date, country, and location of the incident (at the governorate, city, and site level). 
Additionally, the data were coded to include the following variables: whether the 
incident was part of a series, the conflict type (terrorism, riot/protest, other), the 
attack type (accounts for the type of incident in the GTD and the event type in the 
ACLED), whether the incident took place during the period of the first or second 
conflict (two dummy variables), and whether incident was international or domestic. 
Looking at multiple incidents served as a to distinguish if the incident was part of an 
enduring attack or whether it was an isolated event. Combined with the dummy 
variables identifying incidents within each conflict’s time period (1997 – 1998 & 
2011-2014, respectively), these three variables were a proxy for looking at enduring 
conflict compared to isolated incidents. 
To code for international or domestic, I identified incidents that mentioned 
foreign nations Egypt was actively involved with or protesting. Five countries 
(Palestine, Lebanon, the U.S., Israel, and France) were consistently discussed. Since 
most of these events took place at embassies of the nation being targeted, I also 
identified incidents mentioning “embassy.”  Incidents were coded as international if 
they were flagged in any of these 6 terms. All other incidents are assumed to be 
domestic.  
The data were cleaned to remove any duplicate events both within and 
between data sources. Because the ACLED data were designed to capture both 
violent and nonviolent incidents, there were several duplicate incidents that had to be 





territory” and “violence against civilians” in an exchange between militants, police, 
and civilians. There were also 347 cases that existed in both the ACLED and the GTD 
data, 274 of which were coded as terrorism in the GTD. Twelve of these cases were 
coded as both “riots/protests” in the ACLED and “terrorism” in the GTD. As conflict 
is defined here based on terrorism, riots/protests, and other, if an event was coded as 
terrorism in the GTD and not riots/protests in the ACLED, the code of terrorism was 
retained.  
For those events where it was coded as both riots/protests and terrorism, the 
following decision rule was used: if the incident focused on the action of the protest 
itself, then it was coded as a riot/protest. If the protest/riot/protesters are the victims 
or tangential to the action, then it was coded as terrorism variables (see Appendix I 
for a complete codebook). There is a limitation to these armed conflict data. Both the 
ACLED and GTD have detailed codes for actions within armed conflicts (e.g., 
violence against civilians, bombing/explosion). However, it was not possible to 
systematically reconcile the two sets of actions. As such, it was not possible to look at 
more detailed types of armed conflict than terrorism, riot/protest, and other types of 
armed conflict. 
In total, there were 5,762 incidents of armed conflict in Egypt from 1997 – 
2014. As I used multiple time series analysis, the ACLED and GTD data were 
merged together and aggregated to the month and to the quarter to create two time 







It is possible that other factors could influence the relationship between armed 
conflict and antiquities looting. As such, I included several control variables on 
economic and political factors. Economic variables came from the World Bank’s 
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2016) for Egypt from 1997 to 2014. I focused 
on two variables: Egypt’s GDP per capita (in current US$), goods exports balance of 
payment (BoP - in current US$).18 Both variables speak to Egypt’s overall economic 
standing and the potential barrier customs may pose to would-be smugglers. A 
country in economic decline (a lower GDP) may have a higher goods export as they 
rely more on transactions with foreign people and nations. Further, during such a 
time, the restrictions on imports and exports may slacked to decrease the barriers to 
trade. Weak restrictions and increased need for trade may provide increased 
opportunity or incentive for those interested in antiquities looting.  
 Politically, the change of regime or power in Egypt could influence both 
armed conflict and the presence of looting. As such, I included variables on regime 
duration, whether there was a regime change, and the date of the regime change. 
These data came from the Polity IV project, a part of the Integrated Nations Center 
for Societal Conflict Research’s (INCSR’s) database. The polity data continually 
track and update on regime changes around the world (Center for Systemic Peace, 
2015). Both the economic and political variables are only available at year intervals. 
                                                 
18 Goods exports Balance of Payment refer to all movable goods (including nonmonetary gold and net 
exports of goods under merchanting) involved in a change of ownership from residents to nonresidents 





As such, when merging these variables into the antiquities-armed conflict dataset, 
each month of a given year had to have the same value for each control variable.  
There are several limitations with the control variables. The economic control 
variables are only available at the year level, while the analysis is at the month and 
the quarter. Each variable was held constant throughout a year instead of interpolating 
the values, which assumes that all the change in value occurred between December 
and January. Given that the Arab Spring started in January 2011, it seemed 
reasonable to have the change in values occur at the end of the calendar year; 
however, it is not clear what kind of an effect this assumption had on the analysis. 
Finally, though there are a relatively large number of regime changes in the dataset 
(given that regime changes are typically a rare event), there are still many more zeros 
in the data, which may affect the findings. 
Once all data were cleaned and coded, they were aggregated and merged into 
a month-level dataset and a quarter-level dataset. These were the most granular units 
of analysis for which there was sufficient variation in the antiquities looting and 
cultural property crime variables. 
Analytic Plan 
I used open source data to create a time series dataset of incidents of armed 
conflict, antiquities looting, and several control variables from 1997-2014. My 
analysis sought to better understand the relationship between antiquities looting and 
armed conflict in Egypt over this time period using quantitative methods through 
three hypotheses: (1) antiquities looting and armed conflict have a positive 





an increase in armed conflict, and (3) an increase in armed conflict will precede an 
increase in antiquities looting.  
I first looked descriptively at antiquities looting and armed conflict to get a 
sense of whether there was reason to believe they might be related. Then, I used 
multiple time series to look at each temporal ordering more closely. Specifically, I 
used a combination of two extensions of vector autoregression (VAR) (lag-
augmented vector autoregression (LA-VAR) and autoregressive distributed lag model 
(ARDL)) to examine strategic looting and opportunistic looting separately. Using 
open source data has a number of benefits, as described above; however, there are 
also limitations. Most notably, the trends in reporting news have evolved over time 
and so it is not necessarily clear whether the patterns seen in the data reflect the 
underlying patterns in antiquities looting or the changes in reporting trends over time. 
For example, the Arab Spring was a series of armed conflicts across multiple 
countries in the Middle East connected and propelled through the use of social media. 
The number of news articles looking at armed conflict, antiquities looting, and Egypt 
more generally increased dramatically starting at the end of 2010. 
It is not possible to disentangle the changes in reporting trends from the 
underlying changes in patterns of looting activity. One way to address this limitation 
is to look only at the Arab Spring in addition to looking at the broader time period. I 
used monthly data to look at the Arab Spring (2010 – 2014) as a form of sensitivity 
analysis to try to determine the extent to which reporting trends were affecting the 





month as opposed to the quarter) to look in more detail at the conflict and to minimize 
the effect of any decrease in statistical power the analyses would otherwise have. 
I ran 5 sets of models (each model was run at the month and the quarter, 
making 10 models in total) to investigate the relationship between antiquities looting 
and armed conflict. The control variables stayed the same in each model, only the 
main variables of interest changed. The first model looked at antiquities looting and 
all armed conflict events. This provided the foundation for my analysis as it most 
directly looks at the relationship of interest. Yet, as mentioned in the literature review, 
there is reason to believe that antiquities looting to support armed conflict 
(Hypothesis 2) might vary by the type of conflict. As such, the next three models 
looked at the relationship between antiquities looting and terrorism, riots and protests, 
and other armed conflict incidents, respectively.19 Finally, due to the small number of 
incidents for antiquities looting, I also considered the relationship between cultural 
property crime in general and armed conflict to see whether this influenced the results 
of the first model.20 
Each model was run at the month and the quarter. The month analyses provide 
a test of the hypotheses in the context of a specific armed conflict – the Arab Spring. 
While the Arab Spring started in Egypt in 2011, the conflict and movements started in 
2010 in other parts of the world. To account for the possibility of a build-up in 
antiquities looting prior to the start of the conflict in 2011, the month analyses 
covered 2010-2014. Indeed, there was a small increase in antiquities looting at the 
                                                 
19 The other category for type of armed conflict is a broad “catch-all” category for armed conflict and 
includes all types of conflict except for riots/protests and terrorism.  
20 Cultural property crime includes all crimes involving cultural property found in the dataset – theft, 





end of 2010 just before the January 2011 revolutions in Egypt (see Figure 2 – Figure 
5 below). The quarter analyses provide a test of the hypotheses across the whole time 
period. Analyses at the year were considered and ultimately rejected. due to the small 
sample size. 
Lag-Augmented VAR & Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model 
Both antiquities looting and armed conflict incidents are random processes, as 
they are both phenomena that evolve over space and time and whose value at any 
given point in time depends on a set of possible random events (Lindsey, 2004). 
Multiple time series models are appropriate for assessing the mutual associations 
between random processes as they allow for the consideration of all the possible ways 
that armed conflict and antiquities looting can evolve independently and together. The 
LA-VAR and ARDL models are extensions of the basic vector autoregression (VAR) 
model, which looks at the short-term and long-term relationship between two or more 
variables over time. Typically, VAR models are employed in economics to assess the 
effect of changes in policy on phenomena like unemployment, inflation, and interest 
rates (Sola & Driffill, 1994; Stock & Watson, 2001). Yet, in criminology and political 
science, VAR models have been used to assess the effectiveness of antiterrorism 
policies, the dynamics of setting foreign policy agendas, and to understand the 
political process (Enders & Sandler, 1993). VAR models multiple time series data so 
that each series is used as explanatory variables in the other (Lütkepohl, 2011: 2). 
These models are generally inductive, initially treating all variables as endogenous. 
 VAR models and their extensions have several strengths over other time series 





the uncertainty and underlying dynamics of the data. Second, there are multiple 
methods that can help to better understand the relationship between the variables of 
interest (e.g., forecasting, Granger-causality, and structural modeling) (Lütkepohl, 
2011: 2). However, basic VAR models require that all dependent variables have to be 
the same order of integration (i.e. if one variable is differenced all of the variables 
have to be differenced). Another weakness of the VAR model is that they tend to 
have a large number of regression parameters, reducing their parsimony and risking 
overparameterization (Brandt & Williams, 2007: 56). As the analysis proposed here 
does not have a large number of parameters, this should not be a significant 
limitation.  
When conducting a multiple time series analysis, there are a number of 
decisions that have to be made that affect which model(s) are used (Pesaran & Smith, 
1998): 
1. The number of endogenous variables to be included  
2. The number of exogenous variables to be included 
3. The nature of the deterministic variables and whether there need to be 
any restrictions on intercepts or trend coefficients21 
4. The order of the model 
5. The order of integration of the variables 
6. The number of cointegrating vectors22 
7. The lag structure of the model or variables 
Hiro Toda and Taku Yamamoto (1995) proposed a more reliable method for 
testing for cointegration and granger causality in vector autoregression models with 
                                                 
21 There are five different trends (or cases) often encountered in analyses: 1) no intercept of trend, 2) r 
restricted intercepts which enter the cointegrating relations and no trend, 3) m unrestricted intercepts 
and no trends, 4) m unrestricted intercepts and r restricted trends, and 5) m unrestricted intercepts and 
m unrestricted trends (Pesaran & Smith, 1998). In these cases, r is the rank of the model and m refers 
to the order of integration of the variable(s). 
22 Cointegration refers to when at least two variables covary together over time such that together they 
are stationary, even if separately one or more of the variables are not. Engle and Granger (1987) 





possibly integrated processes. Their lag-augmented vector autoregression model 
incorporates additional lags as exogenous variables in the model. After applying a 
normal lag selection procedure to a potentially cointegrated VAR and determining a 
lag length 𝑘, a (𝑘 + 𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥)th-order VAR is estimated, where 𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥 represents the 
maximum order of integration of the variables (Toda & Yamamoto, 1995). This 
process has proved more robust for determining granger causality in small samples 
than alternative methods (Lütkepohl, 2006). If granger causality exists, there must be 
at least one cointegrating relationship in the model (Giles, 2011). As such, this 
method can also be useful for determining whether cointegration might exist. For any 
purpose other than testing for granger causality, the lag-augmented VAR has the 
same restrictions as the basic VAR model in that the variables must be the same order 
of integration (Ashley & Verbrugge, 2009; Giles, 2011).  
The autoregressive distributed lag model (ARDL) was developed to address 
the limitations of other vector autoregression models. Specifically, ARDL was 
developed to be robust in spite of mixed orders of integration (i.e. some variables that 
are I(0) and others that are I(1)), possibly cointegrated relationships, separate lag 
structures for each variable, and small sample sizes (usually less than 100) (Pesaran & 
Shin, 1995, 1997; Pesaran & Smith, 1998; Pesaran et al., 2001). The basic ARDL 
model is in equation (1), where ∑𝛽𝑖∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 +∑𝛽𝑗∆𝑥1𝑡−𝑗 +∑𝛽𝑘∆𝑥2𝑡−𝑘 estimate each set of 
parameters in levels and 𝜃0𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜃1𝑥1𝑡−1 + 𝜃2𝑥2𝑡−1 + 𝜃3𝑥3𝑡−1 estimate the lagged (and/or 
differenced) parameters that combined create an unrestricted error correction term 





for cointegrated relationships and mixed orders of integration between the 
parameters. 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 +∑𝛽𝑖∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 +∑𝛽𝑗∆𝑥1𝑡−𝑗 +∑𝛽𝑘∆𝑥2𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜃0𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜃1𝑥1𝑡−1 + 𝜃2𝑥2𝑡−1 + 𝜃3𝑥3𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 
(1) 
Procedure 
Initial tests of the data revealed that antiquities looting, cultural property 
crime, and the balance of payment for goods exported were all stationary but that 
armed conflict and its derivatives (terrorism, riots and protests, and other) were not.23 
It was also not clear whether or not there were cointegrating relationships among the 
variables. As such, to analyze the relationship between antiquities looting and armed 
conflict, I had to use a method that could a) determine whether any cointegrating 
relationships existed, b) accommodate mixed orders of integration between the 
variables of interest, and c) allow for cointegration in addition to mixed orders of 
integration, if necessary. At both the month and quarter levels of analysis, the data 
have small samples (𝑛 = 60 and 𝑛 = 84, respectively), which affected the ability of 
traditional tests to detect cointegration and granger causality.  
Given the complexity of the data, I used a combination of the LA-VAR and 
ARDL models to analyze the three hypotheses at both the month and quarter levels. It 
is important to note that using the ARDL model in Stata requires that either armed 
conflict or antiquities looting be specified as the dependent variable. As such, the 
                                                 
23 GDP was not tested for stationarity as it was treated as an exogenous variable in the model, meaning 
it was a forced independent variable in the time series models. Also, the goods export variable was 





ARDL model was run with each as the dependent variable. The procedure used for 
each model is as follows: 
1. Check the stationarity of the variables and determine their order of integration 
(𝑚) 
2. Use the Todo-Yamamoto procedure to test for granger causality using the 
Lag-Augmented VAR: 
a. Set up a VAR model in the levels of the data, regardless of each 
variable’s order of integration as determined in step 1. 
b. Determine the appropriate maximum lag length for the VAR based on 
information criteria such as AIC and SIC 
c. Ensure the model is well-specified (no serial correlation, model is 
stable) 
d. Test for cointegration using the Johansen methodology (a standard 
method for testing for cointegration) (SOURCE) 
e. Using the well-specified model, add 𝑚 additional lags of each of the 
variables into each of the equations as an exogenous variable 
f. Test for Granger causality using a Wald test on the first lag of the 
equation (regardless of how many lags there are). 
3. Use the ARDL model to analyze the relationship based on the results of the T-
Y Granger causality tests with armed conflict (or subtype or armed conflict) as 
the dependent variable 
a. Formulate the unrestricted error correction version of the ARDL 
model in equation (1) with armed conflict as the dependent variable 
b. Determine the lag structure of the unrestricted error correction model. 
This lag structure selects a lag for each of the endogenous variables in 
the model. 
c. Make sure the model is well-specified (no serial correlation and the 
model is stable) 
d. Perform a bounds test for cointegrating relationships 
4. Repeat Step 3 and all component steps with antiquities looting (or cultural 





Chapter 5: Results 
 To review, this study used a combination of LA-VAR and ARDL to examine 
the relationship between antiquities looting and armed conflict. Specifically, this 
study evaluated three hypotheses: (1) antiquities looting and armed conflict have a 
positive statistically significant relationship, (2) an increase in antiquities looting will 
precede an increase in armed conflict, and (3) an increase in armed conflict will 
precede an increase in antiquities looting. Each hypothesis was looked at with regard 
to antiquities looting and armed conflict in general. They were then tested to see if the 
relationship varied by type of armed conflict (riots/protests, terrorism, and other types 
of armed conflict). Finally, each hypothesis was looked at with the broader variable 
of cultural property crime and armed conflict to see whether using antiquities looting 
or cultural property crime made a difference. All analyses were conducted at both the 
month and quarter level. The month was the most granular unit of analysis, but due to 
lack of variation in the antiquities looting data, the analyses could only be run from 
2010-2014. The quarter was aggregate enough that the analyses could be run over the 
entire time period (1997-2014). 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 3 provides the summary statistics for the main variables of interest. 
There are significantly fewer antiquities looting (and cultural property crime) 
incidents than any of the armed conflict types. However, overall they have similarly 
skewed distributions (see Figure 2 and Figure 3). Most of the incidents across these 
variables occur immediately before or during the Arab Spring (2011-2014). Figure 4 





Table 3. Summary statistics for the monthly and quarterly data 
Monthly Analyses (2010 - 2014) 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Antiquities Looting 61 1.40984 4.90706 0 31 
Cultural Property Crime 61 1.96721 5.43129 0 31 
Armed Conflict 61 88.4098 103.659 1 468 
Terrorism 61 8.81967 13.2105 0 66 
Riots and Protests 61 53.459 64.2901 0 256 
Other 61 26.1312 32.0694 0 146 
Quarterly Analyses (1997 - 2014) 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Antiquities Looting 72 1.25 6.238793 0 46 
Cultural Property Crime 72 1.777778 7.601375 0 46 
Armed Conflict 72 80.02778 195.427 0 1126 
Terrorism 72 7.875 22.91684 0 135 
Riots and Protests 72 47.34722 118.4717 0 628 
Other 72 24.80556 59.56288 0 363 
 
 
Figure 2 (above). Distribution of antiquities looting and cultural property crime 1997-2014 
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Figure 4 (above). Distribution of antiquities looting and cultural property crime 2010-2014  
Figure 5 (below). Distribution of armed conflict by type (terrorism, riots and protests, other) 2010-2014 
 
Based on a visual comparison of the graphs, it appears that there may be spikes in 
antiquities looting around December 2010/January 2011 and March/April 2013. 
There were regime changes in Egypt in February 2011 and July of 2013. This 
suggests that there could be a relationship between antiquities looting and armed 
conflict, at least during the Arab Spring. Additionally, 30% of armed conflict 
incidents occurred cities and towns with archaeological sites that also had reports of 
looting incidents.24 Table 4 shows the cities that experienced both armed conflict 
incidents and antiquities looting and the number of armed conflict incidents each 
reported in the data. the breakdown of these armed conflict incidents. The proximity 
and frequency of conflict incidents to archaeological sites that were looted may 
                                                 
24 Note, I cannot say for certain that the conflict incidents occurred within the archaeological sites due 
to the nature of the data. However, the immediate vicinity of an archaeological site may make it more 
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suggest a conflict financing relationship. The results of the statistical analyses 
partially support these conclusions. 
Table 4. Cities/Towns that Experienced Both Armed Conflict Incidents and Antiquities Looting Incidents 
City/Town 
















Hypothesis 1: Antiquities Looting and Armed Conflict are Positively Related 
 If cointegration was present between antiquities looting (or cultural property 
crime) and armed conflict (or its types) in an analysis, then that model provided 
support for this hypothesis. Cointegration refers to when there exists a long-term 
relationship between two variables such that they are jointly stationary. As such, if 
cointegration exists between two variables, then they are related. As Table 5 shows, 
all models at both the month and quarter level, except for one, showed that there was 
a positive relationship between antiquities looting and armed conflict. Note that there 
are no values reported in the table. This is because in cointegration analyses, the 
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 𝑝 ≤ 0.01∗∗∗ , 𝑝 ≤ 0.05∗∗ , 𝑝 ≤ 0.10∗  
The model looking at antiquities looting and the other types of armed conflict 
category provided only partial support for this hypothesis. For the quarterly analyses, 
when the other types of armed conflict category was used as the dependent variable, 
there was no evidence of a cointegrating relationship, yet when antiquities looting 





the confusion, at the month level both dependent variables showed evidence of a 
cointegrating relationship. It is possible that since the other types of armed conflict 
category is a “catch-all” category for types of armed conflict, there may be 
cointegrating relationships with antiquities looting that are not being captured in the 
current coding. However, this seems unlikely as the cointegrating relationship was the 
only statistically significant finding in the quarter-level model with antiquities looting 
as the dependent variable.25  
A more likely explanation for this difference in findings is that there is 
support for a relationship between antiquities looting and all types of armed conflict 
during the Arab Spring (covered in the month analyses) but not for armed conflict 
over the whole period of interest (1997-2014). 
Hypothesis 2: Strategic Antiquities Looting in Armed Conflict 
 In general, there seems to be consistent support for the hypothesis that an 
increase in antiquities looting precedes an increase in armed conflict. The relationship 
appears to be more complex that the hypothesis suggests and varies slightly by type 
of conflict. Vector autoregression (VAR) models return results for both short run and 
long run relationships between the variables for as many lags as are included in the 
model. ARDL models, as an extension of VAR, provide a similar set of results.  
The short run relationship looks at the effects of prior changes in antiquities 
looting on changes in armed conflict. The long run relationship looks at the effects of 
                                                 
25 It is important to note that there is very little variation in the antiquities looting variable (i.e. looting 
at archaeological sites) prior to 2010, which may also be affected the results (see Figure 2). The results 
of the quarterly analysis between other conflict events and antiquities looting should be interpreted 





current antiquities looting on changes in armed conflict. In other words, the short run 
relationship looks at how changes in antiquities looting in the past (i.e. a sudden spike 
or drop) affect the current changes in armed conflict. The long run relationship then 
looks at how current antiquities looting is affecting changes in armed conflict over 
time. For there to be support for this hypothesis, at least one of the short or long run 
relationships needs to be positive and statistically significant in the model where 
armed conflict (or one of its types) is the dependent variable.  
Table 6 provides an overview of the results for this set of analyses. As a 
reminder, no coefficient values are reported in the table. In ARDL models, the 
magnitude of the coefficients is not traditionally interpreted. Instead, only the 
direction and significance of the coefficients are reported. The results showed that at 
both the month and quarter, the short run relationship is negative and the long run 
relationship is positive (both are statistically significant). While it does not make 
sense to interpret the actual values of the coefficients, the pattern shown in the results 
is that a change in prior antiquities looting is associated with a small decrease in the 
change in armed conflict in the short run. In the long run, though, current looting is 
associated with a large increase (relative to the short run relationship) in the change in 
armed conflict. This overall pattern is found across the three types of conflict in the 
short run. A change in prior antiquities looting is associated with a small decrease in 
the change in riots and protests, terrorism, and other types of armed conflict.26  
 
                                                 
26 One exception to this was that at the quarter level, a change in prior antiquities looting was 
associated with a small increase in the change in other armed conflict. Because this is a broadly 
defined category of armed conflict, it is not clear if the difference in finding indicates an alternate 





Table 6. The Effects of Antiquities Looting on Armed Conflict 
Month 
  
Short Run Long Run 
+/- Sig. +/- Sig. 
Armed Conflict - *** + ** 
Terrorism - *** + ** 
Riots/Protests - *** + *† 
Other Types of 
Armed Conflict 
- *** + ** 
Quarter 
  
Short Run Long Run 
+/- Sig. +/- Sig. 
Armed Conflict     + *** 
D - ***    
Terrorism    +   
D - ***     
Riots/Protests     + *** 
D - ***     
Other Types of 
Armed Conflict 
    +   
D +       
LD + ***     
L2D + ***     
L3D + ***     
                     𝑝 ≤ 0.01∗∗∗ , 𝑝 ≤ 0.05∗∗ , 𝑝 ≤ 0.10∗  
             †p = 0.055, so it was marginally insignificant at the 0.05 
level, but significant at the 0.10 level. 
Note: D indicates that the variable has been first 
differenced. L indicates that the variable has been 
lagged. Any number refers to the number of lags (e.g., 
L2D refers to a differenced variable with two lags).  
 In the long run, an increase in antiquities looting preceded an increase in all 
three types of armed conflict; however, this is not consistent across the unit of 
analysis. At the month level, this increase is found with both terrorism and other types 
of armed conflict. Riots and protests only saw this increase at the quarter level. This 
suggests that during the Arab Spring, antiquities looting is associated with an increase 





protests. Yet more generally, antiquities looting is associated with increases in riots 
and protests but not terrorism or other types of armed conflict. It is not clear why 
antiquities looting would be associated with increases in riots and protests generally, 
but not during the Arab Spring specifically. Given the lack of variation in the 
antiquities looting variables and almost certain underrepresentation of the true extent 
of looting, these results must be interpreted cautiously. However, overall there is 
moderate support for the hypothesis that increases in antiquities looting is associated 
with an increase in armed conflict.27  
Hypothesis 3: Opportunistic Antiquities Looting in Armed Conflict 
 Across the models, there is only partial support for this hypothesis. For there 
to be support for this hypothesis, at least one of the short or long run relationships 
needs to be positive and statistically significant in the model where antiquities looting 
or cultural property crime is the dependent variable. Table 7 provides an overview of 
the results from all models with antiquities looting as the dependent variable. As a 
reminder, no coefficient values are reported in the table. The results for antiquities 
looting and cultural property crime as dependent variables were the same. As such, 
only the results of the antiquities looting models are presented and discussed.  
There is no support for this hypothesis at the month-level. The armed conflict 
variables were either dropped from the final lag structure or were not significant. At 
the quarter-level, the lagged and second lagged values were significant for all types of 
armed conflict except for terrorism. Lagged values usually absorb variation in the 
                                                 






model and so are not considered. Given that these are significant, I tested the model 
without the lags for those variables and found that they dropped from their respective 
models. This suggests that the relationship may be nonlinear and combined with the 
small non-normally distributed sample of antiquities looting suggests that 
opportunistic looting is more complex than could be adequately captured in these 
analyses. For example, at both the month (in the short run) and quarter (in the long 
run), terrorism had significant negative relationship on antiquities looting and 
riots/protests had a significant negative relationship at the third lagged value.  
Based on these results, I cannot say that opportunistic looting does not 
happen, only that I find no evidence of it in this data. It may be that opportunistic 
looting is less likely to be reported by news agencies except in rare high profile cases 
like the Egyptian museum or Iraq museum. If that is the case, then other data sources 
would need to be used or supplemented to detect the relationship. Relatedly, given the 
lack of variation in the antiquities looting and cultural property crime variables, it 
may also be that this lack of support is an artifact of the small sample size. Either 
way, more research needs to be done to determine whether there is empirical evidence 





Table 7. The Effects of Armed Conflict on Antiquities Looting 
Month 
  
Short Run Long Run 
+/- Sig. +/- Sig. 
Armed Conflict N/A  -  
Terrorism N/A  -  
Riots/Protests N/A  +  
Other Types of 
Armed Conflict 
   -  
D -    
Quarter 
  
Short Run Long Run 
+/- Sig. +/- Sig. 
Armed Conflict    +  
D -    
LD + ***   
L2D + ***   
Terrorism    -  
D -    
LD -    
Riots/Protests    +  
D -    
LD + ***   
L2D + ***   
L3D - ***   
Other Types of 
Armed Conflict 
   +  
D -    
LD + ***   
L2D + ***   
                            𝑝 ≤ 0.01∗∗∗ , 𝑝 ≤ 0.05∗∗ , 𝑝 ≤ 0.10∗  
Note: D indicates that the variable has been first 
differenced. L indicates that the variable has been lagged. 
Any number refers to the number of lags (e.g., L2D refers to 








 Overall, the month and quarterly analyses allowed me to compare findings 
specific to the Arab Spring and the broader time period (1997-2014). There are 
different findings by type of conflict and between the month and quarter units of 
analysis. This suggests that the relationship between armed conflict and antiquities 
looting may be more complex than I can ascertain with the current analysis. For 
example, The Arab Spring involved historically opposed groups (the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Coptic Christians) coming together to bring about a political 
upheaval. Despite the common immediate goal of removing President Morsi, the 
contradictory goals of an Islamic state and secular state with more equality, 
respectively produced a climate conducive to both extensive acts of terrorism and 
riots and protests. As such, the finding that antiquities looting is associated with an 
increase in the change in terrorism but not riots and protests in the context of the Arab 
Spring could be a significant distinction to investigate more closely.  
Additionally, because this relationship is reversed at the quarter level, it may 
be useful to explore alternative explanations for the role of antiquities looting in riots 
and protests. For example, it may not be the case that antiquities are looted to finance 
riots and protests, but instead, the looting or targeting of archaeological sites could be 
the focus for the riots and protests. There is some literature to support that 
archaeological sites and cultural heritage can be strategic targets to send a political 
message (e.g., attempting to erase a culture’s heritage, retaliation against a culture’s 
perceived wrongdoing) (see Grove & Pease, 2014; LeBillon, 2001; Van der Auwera, 





vicinity of archaeological sites, which suggests their importance generally to armed 
conflict. Further, several incidents specifically mentioned targeting Christian 
churches and other cultural heritage sites. 
The Influence of Control Variables 
 Overall, the control variables included in the analysis showed only moderate 
influence on the relationship between antiquities looting and armed conflict. GDP 
was either not significant or a marginally significant impact that negligibly different 
from zero. Regime changes were significantly associated with some armed conflict 
and some antiquities looting. With respect to armed conflict, regime changes were 
only significant in the short term. At the quarter level in the short term, prior changes 
in regime changes were associated with a decrease in the change in riots and protests 
and armed conflict but an increase in terrorism and other types of armed conflict. At 
the month level, prior changes in regime changes were associated with increases in 
changes in armed conflict and terrorism. With respect to antiquities looting, regime 
changes were only significant at the quarter level. In the short term, prior changes in 
regime changes were associated with a decrease in the change in looting, while 
current regime changes were associated with an increase in the change in looting.  
 These findings may in part reflect how control variables are included in the 
models used. Because the LA-VAR and ARDL models are inherently endogenous, 
any variable included is analyzed without any restrictions imposed on it. In the base 
VAR model, the analysis involves creating systems of equations where each variable 
is a dependent variable one equation and an independent variable in the others. It is 





included only as an independent variable in the analyses that only reports short run 
effects. The inclusion of exogenous variables in these models is a relatively recent 
development since endogeneity is considered one of their strengths. As such, most 
VAR models (and its extensions) are run with 2 or 3 variables maximum and 
including control variables can be challenging.  
 In the case of this analysis, GDP was included as a forced exogenous variable 
since it’s effect was constant each year and it would have indirect effects on both 
armed conflict and antiquities looting. Regime changes, on the other hand, can have 
direct impacts on armed conflict and antiquities looting. As such, it was included as a 
third endogenous variable. In the output, GDP was only reported with short term 
effects, while regime change was reported with both short and long term effects. The 
identification of a variable as endogenous or exogenous in the model clearly 
influences the type of findings reported. It is worth noting that all available 
diagnostics on model fit were used to determine the final models to run, including 
Wald statistics to determine the significance of specific variables in the model. GDP 
was only significant to the model when it was included as an exogenous variable, 
while regime change was only significant to the model when it was an endogenous 
variable. 
Limitations 
There are four significant limitations to the above analysis. First, the month 
and quarter analyses do not cover the same time periods. The monthly analysis could 
only look at 2010 – 2014 due to a lack of variation in the looting data prior to 2010. 





distribution of the data. To account for the large number of zeros in the data, I tested 
for heteroscedasticity at both the month and quarter units of analysis. At the quarter 
level, several variables were heteroskedastic; however, the amount of error caused by 
the heteroscedasticity would have had to be excessively large to cause a problem. For 
example, the first difference of antiquities looting was heteroskedastic across all four 
models with the armed conflict and its types as dependent variables. However, in all 
but one of the models, the confidence intervals start at least 1.5 units away from 0 (in 
one case the confidence interval starts a 7).28 At the month level, all variables of 
interest were homoscedastic.  
Second, I attempted to run the models for three separate time periods: conflict 
1 (1997-1998), between conflicts (1999-2009), and conflict 2 (2010-2014). However, 
there was not enough variation in the first two to run the models. To address this, I 
tried including three dummy variables for these time periods, but there were issues 
with multicollinearity at both the month and quarter level that the model could not 
handle.29  
Finally, all models had showed signs of something in the data that has not 
been accounted for and omitted variable bias. Figure 6 shows the results of a 
cumulative sum of squares (CUSUM) analysis. The analysis returns two graphs (the 
CUSUM and CUSUM squared). The CUSUM graph is an indicator of your model’s 
fit. The CUSUM squared graph is an indicator of whether you have captured all the 
patterns in your data through the model specification. These results are from the 
                                                 
28 Although the first difference of antiquities looting was heteroskedastic in the model with other types 
of conflict as the dependent variable, it was not significant and so is not relevant. 
29 I tried running these models with the time period dummy variables as both endogenous and 





quarterly analysis of the effect of antiquities looting on armed conflict, but are 
representative of the results of this analysis for all the quarterly models. The monthly 
models showed similar patterns, but they were less obvious because of the restricted 
time period.  
 
Figure 6. The cumulative sum of squares 
As can be seen in the first graph, the model is a relatively good fit overall; however, 
the second graph indicates that there is something not being accounted for in the 
model that is pulling it outside the lower boundary. This may reflect in part the 
omitted variable bias and may also reflect the disproportionate number of zeros in the 
antiquities looting data. This is not surprising given the problems with the antiquities 
looting data and the small number of parameters in the model. However, it does mean 
that these findings should be interpreted with caution and should be considered as 
preliminary. 
Summary of Results 
 Overall, the above results indicate strong support for the first hypothesis, 
moderate support for the second hypothesis, and weak support for the third 
hypothesis. Table 8 provides the summary of results by hypothesis. These findings 














variable of cultural property crime. There was some variation by type of armed 
conflict, suggesting that this is an area that should be investigated further. These 
results suggest that the other types of armed conflict category may need to be further 
investigated.  




























Moderate Strong N/A N/A 
Terrorism Strong Strong Moderate   N/A N/A 




Strong   Moderate   N/A N/A 
Overall Level of 
Support 
Strong Moderate Weak 







Chapter 6: Discussion 
The above analyses are an important first step in understanding the 
relationship between antiquities looting and armed conflict. Although the method 
used cannot capture a causal relationship, the hypotheses address two of John Stuart 
Mill’s (1882) three criteria for causation (a positive statistically significant 
relationship, temporal ordering, and alternative explanations). The first hypothesis 
directly tests whether there is a positive statistically significant relationship between 
antiquities looting. The remaining two hypotheses look at two different temporal 
orderings of events. The results indicate strong support for the first hypothesis, 
moderate support for one temporal ordering (antiquities looting preceding armed 
conflict), and weak support for the other temporal ordering. This is the first study to 
look at these questions directly using quantitative data and methods and makes two 
important contributions. This is the first study to demonstrate empirical support for 
the relationship between antiquities looting and armed conflict. This is also the first 
study to not only look at each temporal order separately but to find differing levels of 
support for them. Each contribution is discussed in more depth below. 
The Relationship between Antiquities Looting and Armed Conflict 
 The first of Mill’s (1882) criteria for causality is that there must be a 
relationship between the phenomena of interest. This is usually seen in the form of a 
positive statistically significant relationship. This study hypothesizes that there is 
such a relationship between antiquities looting and armed conflict. The results 





there is empirical evidence for the relationship between antiquities looting and armed 
conflict. Further, the variation in the significance of the relationship by type of armed 
conflict (see Table 5) suggests that this relationship may depend on the specific 
conflict in question. For example, other types of armed conflict was only sometimes 
related to antiquities looting and riots/protests was not as strongly related to 
antiquities looting at the month as it was at the quarter. Because the monthly analyses 
focused on the Arab Spring, it may be that antiquities looting was more related to 
terrorism than riots/protests and other types of armed conflict during this conflict. 
This is an important finding as it is the first such empirical evidence in the literature 
and provides a baseline for future research. However, by itself, this finding does not 
tell us anything about the temporal ordering of the relationship between antiquities 
looting and armed conflict. 
Temporal Ordering: Strategic vs. Opportunistic Looting 
 The second of Mill’s (1882) criteria for causality is that for there to be a 
causal relationship between X and Y, then X must precede Y. The second and third 
hypotheses in this study test both temporal orderings (antiquities looting preceding 
armed conflict and vice versa). Evidence for antiquities looting preceding armed 
conflict would suggest that the looting was strategic and could be associated with an 
armed conflict financing argument. By contrast, evidence for armed conflict 
preceding antiquities looting would suggest that the looting was opportunistic and a 
result of the breakdown in social order. These temporal orderings are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive as both could potentially occur during an armed conflict by 





This study found some evidence for both temporal orderings; however, the 
results for the strategic angle were stronger than for the opportunistic angle. These are 
important findings for several reasons. First, this is the first study to be able to look at 
temporal ordering and while there are limitations with the data, the results suggest 
that it is important to distinguish between strategic and opportunistic looting. Second, 
when combined with the positive statistical relationship, this study can partially look 
at causality, which has not been attempted before. Third, these results provide 
important direction for future research. 
The findings on opportunistic looting suggest that open source news articles 
may not be able to capture enough of the dark figure of looting to provide a 
comprehensive picture of the situation. As such, alternative sources of data should be 
considered and utilized in empirical analysis. Satellite images of archaeological sites 
may be a useful source of data. Research has shown that it is possible to calculate the 
number of looter tunnels within a single image and to estimate the probability that an 
object was taken based on the depth of the hole (see Parcak, 2009). If images were 
taken frequently enough, it would be possible to estimate the changes in antiquities 
looting over time with more precision than news stories allow. The geographic 
location of the looting would be known and the images may capture some of the 
individuals committing the looting (depending on when they are taken). 
The findings on strategic looting suggest that there may be a difference 
between looting funding the initiation of armed conflict and sustaining an existing 
armed conflict. The results described antiquities looting as having a decreasing then 





suggest that antiquities looting supports armed conflict. However, a distinction should 
be made between supporting the start of an armed conflict and sustaining an ongoing 
conflict. Both forms of support are strategic and would treat antiquities looting as the 
extraction of a natural resource. While ARDL models are not able to clearly 
distinguish the start of an armed conflict from the duration of an armed conflict, the 
difference in the short run and long run relationships suggests that such distinction 
may be important to look at in the future. 
Because the short run relationship considers the effects of past actions on 
changes in current events, it may be able to inform whether antiquities looting affects 
the start of an armed conflict in future research. Whether antiquities looting supports 
the start of an armed conflict depends on your interpretation of the lagged variables in 
the model and the length of the lag. In the current study, antiquities looting never had 
more than 2 lags in the ARDL models, meaning that a lag never represented more 
than a 2 month or quarter lag.  
As such, a negative effect of prior change in antiquities looting on current 
change in armed conflict could indicate that increases in antiquities looting stopped as 
the conflict was about to begin. Such an interpretation makes sense if the actors in the 
conflict have extracted what they need to finance their initial attacks and have 
switched from financing to planning and execution of their attacks. However, a 
negative effect could also indicate that antiquities looting decreases prior to the start 
of armed conflict for the length of the lag. This interpretation requires explained by 
factors other than conflict financing and natural resources in armed conflict. The 





determine whether they are evidence for or are relevant to antiquities looting funding 
the start of a conflict.  
The long run relationship, meanwhile, supports the argument for sustaining 
conflict by looking at the effect of current antiquities looting on changes in armed 
conflict in the long term. The strong statistically significant positive effect found in 
the models provides convincing evidence that strategic resource extraction, like 
antiquities looting, during a conflict could help to continue to finance operations. 
Combined, the short run and long run findings suggest that while there may or may 
not be evidence for antiquities looting supporting the start of armed conflict, there 
may be evidence for the argument that looting sustains armed conflict. This is an 
important finding not only because it provides some evidence for strategic antiquities 
looting in armed conflict, including as a source of conflict and terrorism financing. It 
is also important because it suggests that there may be a more nuanced relationship 
between antiquities looting and financing than previously thought. Despite the 
importance of the findings from this study thus far, there are alternative explanations 
that could not be accounted for that must be addressed. 
Alternative Explanations: Crime vs. Antiquities Looting 
 The third of Mill’s (1882) criteria for causality is that for causality to exist, 
one must be able to account for all alternative explanations. This is the most difficult 
criterion to meet because it is almost impossible to account for every possible 
alternative explanation. However, it is important to demonstrate that your analysis 
accounts for as many alternative explanations as possible. This study attempted to 





between armed conflict and antiquities looting. Unfortunately, there are two 
alternative explanations this analysis was not able to account for.  
First, as mentioned before, one of the main limitations with open source data 
are that it is not possible to differentiate between changes in reporting trends and 
patterns in the underlying antiquities looting behaviors. To address this limitation, I 
conducted a sensitivity analysis by running all models for just the Arab Spring (2010 
– 2014) using the month unit of analysis. I then compared these results with those 
from the quarterly analyses of the broader time period (1997-2014). The results of the 
sensitivity analyses were largely consistent with the results from the broader analyses. 
Despite the consistency in results, I cannot be sure that the findings of this analysis 
actually reflect the underlying patterns of antiquities looting and not trends in 
reporting. 
I also cannot be certain that the findings of this analysis are unique to 
antiquities looting. It was not possible to account for the influence of crime in general 
on this relationship as no country-level crime rate statistics were available for Egypt 
from 1997 – 2014. This is a significant limitation. The findings could reflect a unique 
relationship between antiquities looting and armed conflict, but they could also reflect 
the broader relationship between crime in general and armed conflict. 
 Armed conflict creates opportunities for crime to occur and transforms 
existing criminal opportunities. For example, looting behaviors (of electronics, 
destruction of property, etc.) often occur in violent conflicts. Mac Ginty (2004) 
examined the relationship between violent conflicts and looting behaviors, which he 





broadly speaking, conflict created opportunities for looting behaviors (Mac Ginty, 
2004). He argues this occurs through a combination of the lack of social order 
preventing crime and the range of motivations behind looting (affective, political, and 
economic-rational) (Mac Ginty, 2004). 
 Existing criminal opportunities and markets are also affected by armed 
conflict. Drug cultivation and distribution is both fostered and transformed by armed 
conflict (Cornell, 2007). The lack of social order allows such markets to continue to 
operate; however, their methods of sales and distribution have to adapt as the market 
shapes and adapts to the conditions of conflict (Cornell, 2007).  
 Crime also affects and shapes armed conflict through a crime-rebellion nexus 
(Galeotti, 1998). In particular, organized crime can affect rebellions by pitting sides 
of conflicts against each other, particularly in countries where there are criminal 
markets that are entrenched in its’ social and political history (Galeotti, 1998; 
Makarenko, 2004). For example, Galeotti (1998) looks at how the prominence of the 
opiate trade and organized crime in Turkey has fostered and shaped the rebellion of 
the Kurds against the Turkish state. He found that the longstanding trade in opiates 
and social/political structures in Turkey helped to create connections between 
criminal groups and key political figures in both sides of the conflict. The protection 
afforded by these figures helped the organizations thrive and to influence the 
direction of the conflict to their benefit (Galeotti, 1998). Makarenko (2004) similarly 
looks at the role of transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and terrorism and 





Controlling for crime in general, including organized crime and street crime is 
important to understanding the relationship between armed conflict and antiquities 
looting. Without the ability to control for crime in general, this study cannot rule out 
the possibility that the relationship between armed conflict and antiquities looting is 
spurious. 
Summary and Directions for Future Research 
This thesis sought to better understand this relationship using newly created 
quantitative data and empirical analysis. Using open source news stories, I created a 
time series dataset of reports of antiquities looting and armed conflict. Then using a 
combination of lag-augmented vector autoregression and autoregressive distributed 
lag models, I analyzed the data with respect to three hypotheses: (1) antiquities 
looting and armed conflict are positively related; (2) an increase in antiquities looting 
is associated with an increase in armed conflict, and (3) an increase in armed conflict 
is associated with an increase in antiquities looting. The first hypothesis received 
strong support, the second moderate support, and third weak support.  
There are several findings worth highlighting. First, the analysis revealed a 
pattern where prior changes in antiquities looting were associated with a small 
decrease in armed conflict and current antiquities looting was associated with a 
sustained increase in armed conflict. This pattern holds in general across units of 
analysis, though there were differences by type of conflict in the long-run 
relationships. This is supports the idea that looting can be strategic in armed conflict 
and provides evidence for the conflict financing angle. It also emphasizes the need to 





Second, while the analyses did not support the hypothesis that increases in 
armed conflict is associated with an increase in antiquities looting, I cannot say this 
means opportunistic looting does not occur. Rather, this suggests that these data are 
not able to capture this type of looting. Third, despite the limitations in the data these 
analyses show that there is value in using quantitative data. They allow for a more 
nuanced analysis of the relationship between antiquities looting and armed conflict 
than either individual case studies or journalistic evidence can. They also enable the 
use of quantitative methods such as multiple time series. Finally, this research 
emphasizes the importance of using quantitative methods to better understand this 
relationship. Though this research is an initial attempt to apply empirical analysis, the 
findings are significant and provide a baseline and direction for future research.  
There are four directions for future research based on this study. First, future 
research should consider other sources of quantitative data to address the limitations 
of using open source news stories. Second, quantitative methods should continue to 
be used investigate further the relationship between antiquities looting and different 
types of armed conflict. Third, future research should expand this analysis to other 
countries to see if these initial findings are supported, particularly countries with 
overall crime data available to rule out alternative explanations. Finally, given the 
promising findings from this study, the relationship between antiquities looting and 








Antiquities Looting and Armed Conflict Codebook 
General 
Year (year): year 
 
Month (month): month 
 
Quarter (quarter): quarter 
 
Antiquities Looting Data Coding 
The data have already been loaded into an excel spreadsheet. The variables Old 
Reuter number, ID number, Date of story, lead sentence, and searchterm have been 
pre-loaded. The remaining variable need to be coded. Follow the coding directions 
here. 
 
Old Reuter Number (oldreutnumb): An ID number from the Reuters data 
 
ID Number (id): Each ID has a number indicating which dataset the incident comes 
from, the year, the month, and a count variable to ensure the ID is unique. IDs from 
Lexis Nexus dataset start with “8”, IDs from Reuters dataset start with “7.” Created 




Count (count): A count variable starting at 1 used to create the unique id variable. 
 
Date of story (publish_date): code in format mm/dd/yyyy 
 
Lead Sentence (leadsentence): The lead sentence of the story to be coded 
 
Remove (remove): code 1 if the row is to be removed, code 0 otherwise. If the row is 
marked with 1, mark the reason in removenotes and do NOT code the rest of that row. 
A sentence must meet the following three conditions to stay in the dataset, if one is 
not met, it should be removed. Duplicate sentences should also be removed. 
 Condition #1: The sentence must take place in Egypt 
 Condition #2: The sentence must be about looting of antiquities 
Condition #3: The sentence must be describing an action or incident, not a 






Unsure (unsure): code 1 if unsure whether the row should be removed or not and 
mark the reason in removenotes. Continue to code the remainder of the row as best as 
possible. These sentences will be reviewed again. 
 
Remove Notes (removenotes): Briefly describe why the row is being removed or 
why you are unsure if it should be removed. 
 
Searchterm (searchterm): The searchterm used to isolate the sentence – Reuters 
only. 
 
Lexis Nexis Document Number (lexisnexisdocument): The Lexis Nexis output 
automatically numbers each of the results, put the number here – Lexis Nexis only. 
 
Newspaper (newspaper): The name of the newspaper the story was published in. 
 
Title (title): The title of the news story. 
 
File source (filesource): The name of the electronic file that contains each news 
story. 
 
Date of incident (year, month, day): code in 3 columns, one for year, one for month, 
and one for day. If no information is provided in the lead sentence, leave blank. 
Unless the day of the incident is indicated, leave the day blank. Some stories use 
indirect language to refer to the date. Use the following system to account for these 
linguistic cues: 
 2 = couple 
 3 = several’ 
 5 = many 
 Mid = the mid-point (e.g., “mid-1990s” would be coded as 1995)  
Description of the incident (incidentsumm): Provide a 1-2 sentence description of 
the incident in the story. 
 
Location of the incident/looting (incidentloc): write-in as much detail as possible 















Location (specific) (locspec): code the location according to the following scheme. 
An archaeological site includes the grounds and structures within it. A museum is a 
building that must be publicly identified as a museum. Note that storage facilities for 
museums and archaeological sites should be coded as “other,” because these are 
buildings separate from the site or museum themselves. Similarly, if a location is not 
specific (e.g., public collection) it should be coded as “other.” Code “no information” 
if it is not possible to identify the location of the incident from the information 
provided or a brief supplement search online. 
 1 = archaeological site 
 2 = museum 
 3 = other 
 4 = no information 
Location (text) (locspect_text): The text if coded as “other.” 
 
Type of incident (incidtype): code the type of incident described in the following 
scheme. Code for looting if the action was taking an object from the ground or 
structural complex of an archaeological site. In the case that a site is mentioned to be 
looted consistently for a long period of time, it is assumed that at least one looting 
would happen per day and so the incident is counted 1/day unless details are provided 
identifying separate lootings. Note that the act of looting necessarily destroys the site. 
Code for destruction if the purpose of the incident was to destroy not the take 
anything. Theft requires that the object(s) have been recorded and removed from the 
site. For example, an object taken from an archaeological site storage facility is theft 
because the objects have already been discovered and recorded. The exception to this 
are objects physically attached to a structure within the archaeological site. For 
example, if a part of a statue is removed or part of a mural cut from a wall or tomb, 
this action would be considered looting even if the object(s) had been identified 
previously by archaeologists.  
 1 = destruction 
 2 = looting 
3 = theft 
 
Recovered (recovered): indicates whether the object(s) were recovered.  
 1 = yes 
 0 = no 
 
Date recovered (recoverydate): if the objects were recovered, this field indicates the 
date they were recovered. Code in mm/dd/yyyy. If a specific day is not mentioned, 
then assume the middle of the month. If the incident is referred to as “early” or “late” 
assume the first or last day of the month, respectively. If the objects were recovered 








Related documents (relateddocuments): The document number(s) from Lexis Nexis 
or Reuters of cases that are the same or related to the current one. Code this variable 
the first time the incident occurs. May code the other times as well, but make sure the 
first incident is complete with all related documents. If supplemental sources were 
used to triangulate information, include a link to them here. 
 
Repatriated objects (repatriatedobjects): Write the object(s) that were repatriated.  
 
Repatriated (repatriated): indicates whether the object(s) were recovered.  
 1 = yes 
 0 = no 
 
Repatriation date (repatriationdate): if the objects were repatriated, this field 
indicates the date they were recovered. Code in mm/dd/yyyy. If a specific day is not 
mentioned, then assume the middle of the month. If the incident is referred to as 
“early” or “late” assume the first or last day of the month, respectively. If the objects 










Armed Conflict Data Coding 
These are the variable which I am using, ones marked with * are those I created and 
added to the data. 
 
Id (id): A unique identifier for each incident of armed conflict. The IDs for the GTD 
and ACLED were kept and merged together. 
 
Date of incident (year, month, day): code in 3 columns, one for year, one for month, 
and one for day. 
 
Event Type (eventtype): From the ACLED, describes the granular type of event for 
each incident. Some incidents are coded twice if there are two event types present. 
These duplicates were removed from the data during cleaning.  
 
Admin1 (admin1): From the ACLED. The governorate or region in which the 
incident took place. 
 
Admin2 (admin2): From the ACLED. The city or area in which the incident took 
place. 
Provstate (admin1): From the GTD. The governorate or region in which the incident 
took place. During cleaning was renamed admin1 so that it could be merged with the 
ACLED variable. 
 
City (admin2): From the GTD. The city or area in which the incident took place. 
During cleaning was renamed admin2 so that it could be merged with the ACLED 
variable. 
 
Location (location): From the ACLED. The specific location of the incident. 
 
Latitude (latitude): From the GTD & ACLED. The latitude of the incident. Latitude 
and Longitude were used to compare incidents during cleaning to determine whether 
there were any overlapping events between the GTD and the ACLED. 
 
Longitude (longitude): From the GTD & ACLED. The longitude of the incident. 
Latitude and Longitude were used to compare incidents during cleaning to determine 
whether there were any overlapping events between the GTD and the ACLED. 
 
Description of incident (Notes): Provides a brief 1-2 sentence overview of the 
incident from the database as applicable. During cleaning the variables were made to 
both be named “Notes” and so could be merged into one variable. 
 From GTD = incident summary variable 








*Multiple incident (multincident): Code according to the following scheme. This 
variable accounts for acts that occur as part of a series. For example, three buses set 
on fire in 3 cities would be 3 separate instances but if coordinated are part of the same 
series of incidents.  
 1 = yes 
 0 = no 
 
*Related incident (relatedincidents): the IDs of the other related rows in the 
coordinated/series of incidents. 
 
*Conflict type (conflicttype): Code according to the following scheme. Coding for 1 
(i.e. terrorism) means that there was a “0” for the variable doubtterr. In the GTD, all 
others from the variable doubtterr should be coded as a 3 (i.e. other). In the ACLED, 
all incidents of “Riots/Protests” from the variable EVENT_TYPE should be coded as 
2. All incidents coded as “Terrorism” from the variable CONFLICT_TEXT should be 
coded as 1. Everything that is not coded as 1 or 2 should be coded as 3. Some 
incidents in the ACLED may be have both terrorism and riots/protests coded already. 
If the incident focuses on the action of the protest itself, then code it as a riot/protest. 
if the protest/riot/protesters are the victims or tangential to the action, then code it as 
terrorism.  
 1 = Terrorism (0 in doubterr) 
2 = Riots/protests (from eventtype) 
3 = Other 
*Attack Type (attacktype): This variable combines the event types from the ACLED 
with the Attack types from the GTD. Code according to the following scheme. 
Information for this variable comes from the GTD variable attacktype1. When 
combining with ACLED’s type of incident, refer to the descriptions of each type of 
attack on pages 21-23 of the GTD codebook. #1-9 come from the GTD, #10-18 come 
from the ACLED. 
 1 = assassination  
 2 = armed assault 
 3 = bombing/explosion 
 4 = hijacking 
 5 = hostage taking (barricade incident) 
 6 = hostage taking (kidnapping) 
 7 = facility/infrastructure attack 
 8 = unarmed assault 
 9 = unknown 
 10 = battle-no change of territory 
 11 = battle- non-state actor overtake territory 
12 = battle – gov’t regains territory 
13 = headquarters or base established 
14 = strategic developments 
15 = riots/protests 





17 = non-violent transfer of territory 
18 = remote violence 
 
*Conflict1 (conflict1): A dummy variable indicating whether the incident took place 
during the first conflict in Egypt from 1993 – 1998. 
 1 = yes 
 0 = no 
 
*Conflict2 (conflict2): A dummy variable indicating whether the incident took place 
during the second conflict in Egypt from 2011 – 2014. 
 1 = yes 
 0 = no 
 
*Domestic/International (Domestic): Code according to the following scheme. A 
domestic incident is one that is domestic in focus and perpetrated by citizens of 
Egypt. An international incident is on that is international in focus and/or is 
perpetrated by people from other countries, regardless of whether it was within the 
borders of Egypt. This variable was coded by conducting a search of all summary 
information for key words of known countries to be active or have international 
relevance to Egypt, including Palestine, Lebanon, the US, Israel, and France. In 
addition, most internationally focused incidents appear to have occurred around or in 
embassies, so the key word search also included ‘embassy.’ It is important to note 
that this variable was in no way coded based on the 4 “international” variables in the 
GTD (INT_LOG, INT_IDEO, INT_MISC, INT_ANY). 
1 = international 
2 = domestic 
3 = unknown 
 
*Country variables (Palestine, Lebanon, US, Israel, France, Embassy): To get at 
whether the incident is domestic or internationally focused, there are a series of 
dummy variables identifying which incidents relate to other countries. For example, a 
number of incidents relate to people dying as they try to cross the Egypt-Gaza border 
in support of Palestine. Currently there are dummy variables for: Palestine, Lebanon, 
US, Israel, France, and “embassy” (to catch other less common international players 
in the area). 
 
Source: Code according to the following scheme. Not kept in the final dataset 
because the incidents are aggregated to the month. 
1 = ACLED  







Economic Control Variables  
These variables are taken from the World Bank Development Indicators data, which 
are partially maintained by the International Monetary Fund. The only changes made 
to these variables was to add twelve months to each year. Each month of a year has 
the same value since these data are only available on a yearly basis. For example, the 
GDP per capita (in current US$) would be the same for January – December 1997, 
but would change starting January 1998. 
 
GDP per capita in current US $ (GDP_CD): The gross domestic product divided 
by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers 
in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the 
value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in 
current U.S. dollars (World Bank national accounts data and OECD National 
Accounts data files). 
 
Goods Export Balance of Payment (BoP) in current US $ (goodsexport_CD): 
Goods exports refer to all movable goods (including nonmonetary gold and net 
exports of goods under merchanting) involved in a change of ownership from 
residents to nonresidents. Data are in current U.S. dollars (International Monetary 
Fund Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook and data files). 
Political Control Variable 
These data are taken from the Polity IV project, which tracks regime changes in all 
major countries over time. The data were used to create a new variable called 
regimechange that indicates the presence of a regime change in a given month and 
year. 
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